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Abstract
This thesis investigates how the economy and social institutions aect each other. Specif-
ically, the rst chapter analyzes the interaction between politics and the economy: how
the political parties form a coalition in the government to implement their preferred scal
policy. The second chapter examines the eect of criminal law reform on the behavior
of agents in the court process in the United States, applying econometric methodology.
The last chapter statistically reports on the change in the emissions of local air pollutants
in the Czech Republic, reecting the new requirement of EU regulations and economic
growth during the transition period.
The rst paper examines how the two dimensions of heterogeneity of people in society,
income disparity and ethnic diversity, aect the government formation and eventually the
reallocation of income. A legislative bargaining model is constructed to investigate how
political parties, whose platforms are distinguished by the ethnicity and income group
they belong, form a coalition and enter a government. The result of the model, where the
agenda setter gives the minimum to the partner, suggests that the preferred partner in a
coalition is the group with the smaller population size (cheaper to buy) and lower income
level (easier to tax), which are quite intuitive results, considering the minimal(minimum)-
winning coalition theory. Further the model is extended from a one-round to a two-round
game. In fact, the extended model shows that forming an oversized coalition might be
the optimal strategy, which is consistent with the empirical ndings in some developed
countries such as Denmark or Sweden.
The second paper analyzes the eect of criminal law reform on the behavior of agents
during litigation and is coauthored with Libor Dusek. We investigate behavioral responses
of judges and prosecutors to more severe punishments by analyzing the eects of Truth-in-
Sentencing (TIS) laws in a large sample of individual criminal cases in the United States.
The TIS laws raised eective punishment by requiring oenders to serve at least 85% of
their imposed sentence in prison. Dierences between the states in the timing of adoption
and the types of crimes covered provide a source of identication. The key ndings are:
(1) The TIS laws reduced the probability that an arrested oender is eventually convicted
by 8% through an increase in the probability that the case is dismissed, a reduction in
the probability that the defendant pleads guilty, and a reduction in the probability that
the defendant is convicted at trial. (2) The TIS laws reduced the imposed sentence that
a defendant may expect upon arrest by 2%. The behavioral responses are empirically
important to partially mitigate the intended deterrent eect of the TIS laws.
vii
The third paper statistically documents how the relationship between economy and
environmental degradation changes under the regulation and is coauthored with Milan
Scasny. We statistically decompose the change in the emission level of the various air pol-
lutants such as SOx, CO, NOx, VOC and particulate matters (PM) in the Czech Republic.
First, we decompose the emission level in 1995-2007 into three factors: the emission inten-
sity eect, the scale eect, and the composition eect. We nd that the implementation
of command and control type laws which require large sources of emissions to satisfy
emission limits till 1999, highly correlates with a reduction in the emission levels of SOx,
NOx, CO, and PM. Moreover, the reduction was mainly induced by a change in the
emission intensity eect, which captures the environmental eciency relative to the per
capita GDP. We further decompose emission intensity eect into three factors for a more
rened analysis: (1) fuel intensity eect (2) fuel mix eect, and (3) emission coecient
eect. We nd that the emission coecient eect is the most prominent factor, especially
during the period of 1995-1999. In other words, command and control regulation moti-
vates rms to decrease their emission levels by improving abatement technology, which








This paper examines how the two dimensions of income disparity and ethnic diver-
sity aect political coalition formation and the reallocation of income. I construct a
legislative bargaining model to investigate along which dimension a political coali-
tion is formed. The results of the model suggest that the partner for a coalition
is the group with a lower aggregate income: a smaller population size and a lower
income level. Further, I extend the model from a one-round to a two-round game.
The extended model shows that forming an oversized coalition is a possible political
outcome, as opposed to the theory of the minimum winning coalition, but more
consistent with empirical ndings.
Keywords: Political economy; Diversity; Legislative bargaining; Over-
sized coalition
JEL Codes: D3; D7; H3; H4
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1.1 Introduction
Ethnic diversity has been considered to have a negative impact on an economy because the
diversity of people tends to lead to a political conict, ghting for particular interests.
In this regard, Alesina and Glaser (2004), however, argue that ethnic diversity is not
necessarily equivalent to ethnic conict: The negative eect of diversity does not appear
if the ethnic minority are rich. However, their argument does not quite hold in the case
of Rwanda, where the ethnic minority Tutsi are also relatively rich, but they still ght
for redistribution. Here lies the starting point of this paper: If the ethnic minority are
rich, does it always decrease the ethnic political conict?
This paper partially answers this question by analyzing political coalition formations
along two dimensions: income inequality and ethnic diversity. Specically, I analyze
under what circumstances the political coalitions along ethnic lines and income class are
formed using a simple legislative bargaining model. There is a gap in the literature: It is
assumed that ethnic diversity leads to ethnic political conict. Further, there are very few
studies which study the eect of diversity when the diversity is multi-dimensional. This
paper tries to ll this gap by analyzing the political coalition formation when there are
the two dimensions of income disparity and ethnic diversity and examines under which
conditions the ethnic diversity leads to ethnic political coalitions.
In this respect, Przeworski (2005) claims that the relative size of an ethnic group
does not necessarily correlate with the share of the vote of the ethnic political group i.e.,
the population size of an ethnic group does not have to coincide with that of political
parties representing ethnic groups, which suggests that the political outcome does not
always reect the ethnic diversity in the population.1 Below is a modied example from
Przeworski. Assume that everybody can stand as a candidate as in the citizen-candidate
model.2 There are two ethnic groups, A and B, and additionally within the group, some
of the members are rich and some are poor. Thus, we can classify people into four groups:
A and rich, B and rich, A and poor, and B and poor. Assume that each group has a
population size smaller than one-half, and thus to get a majority of agreement, each group
has to make a coalition with another. They can form a coalition either along ethnic lines
or according to their income class. Because they divide a xed pie within the coalition
1In this regard, Posner (2005) also argues that people usually have several attributes such as linguistic,
income level or ethnicity, along which they vote.
2For details of the citizen-candidate model, see Osborne and Slivinski (1996) as the pioneer work or
Coate and Besley (1997), who point out the tractability of the model under a mutli-dimensional policy
space.
2
if they win, they want to form a coalition which is a majority but as small a population
size as possible. Let's consider two cases which are presented in the table below.
rich poor total
A 25 35 60
B 30 10 40
total 55 45 100
rich poor total
A 10 45 55
B 30 15 45
total 40 60 100
The numbers in each cell express the population of each group respectively. In both
tables, the ethnic minority B are relatively rich (the proportion of the rich is larger than
the poor). In the left table above, the group of the rich forms a coalition because the
population size of the coalition of the income class group, the rich (55%), is smaller than
that of the ethnic majority group A (60%).3 On the other hand, in the right table, the
ethnic group A can win with a smaller portion of votes (55%) than the coalition of the
income class group, the poor (60%); thus, group A would form a coalition as in the case
of Rwanda. In both cases, the ethnic minority B are relatively rich; however, the political
result is dierent. Political ethnic conict is more likely to occur in the case of the right
table, where the coalition is formed along ethnicity.
Although this paper is based on quite a similar idea to Przeworski's (2005), there are
two main points where this paper is signicantly dierent from his. First, Przeworski's
example mainly deals with the voting; however, in this paper, government formation in
the legislature, i.e., one stage after voting, is considered.4 Secondly, in Przeworski, only
the population size of the group is considered, whereas in this paper, income distribution
is also taken into account. In fact, the introduction of income dierence to the ethnic
diversity of people leads to interesting ndings: The coalition is likely to be formed with
the group whose population size is smaller, and the income level is relatively low because
its outside option when it is outside of the coalition is low, and thus, it is cheaper to
subsidize that group to be a partner in a coalition. This nding might provide a key
insight into the question why we see ethnic-based coalitions in most of the countries in
Africa, where each ethnic group is small in population size, and the income level is low.
In Table 1.1, I summarize the coalition type across world regions in the year 1975-2006.
3Alternatively, if the poor are in the majority and have a smaller population size than the ethnic
majority group, the poor forms a coalition and enters the government.
4Regarding the analysis of the voting stage, for example, Wrede (2009) analyzes the redistribution
when there is inter- and intra-regional diversity within the state, using the citizen-candidate model.
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Here, a "non-economic coalition" is dened as either (1) within a political coalition in
the government, where the right and left wing parties co-exist or (2) the largest party
in the government is neither left nor right wing. As you can see in Africa, compared to
other regions, the share of non-economic coalitions over all the types of coalitions is much
higher, which is consistent with the ndings of this paper.
Another theoretical nding of this paper is that when the poor are in the majority,
and the income dierence between the rich and the poor is above the threshold, political
coalitions along class lines are formed. In fact, this nding partially explains the political
situation in Latin America, where the income inequality is very high as can be seen in
Table 1.3, and coalitions based on class are more likely to be formed. When the rich
are in the majority, this relation between income dierence and coalition formation gets
reversed: If income inequality is above the threshold, ethnic coalitions are likely to be
formed. If we consider the stylized fact that income inequality is relatively high when
countries are poor and when they become richer, income inequality tend to decrease,5
coalitions along ethnicity are formed only in poor countries but not in the middle-income
and rich countries. This might give some insights into why we tend to see ethnic coalition
in developing countries, but not often in developed countries, as you can see in Table 1.1.
The results above are when bargaining occurs only in one round and is consistent
with Riker's (1962) minimal winning coalition theory and many others: A coalition will
form with as small a group as possible as long as it is winning. However, in the reality,
this is not all the time case. In fact, as in Volden and Carruba (2004), almost half of
the coalitions are oversized rather than minimal winning. Here, an oversized coalition is
dened as "any coalition in which at least one party can be removed with the remaining
members still controlling a majority of seats" (Volden and Carruba 2004, pp.526). In
Table 1.2, I summarize the share of the oversized coalition over all the types of coalitions
across the dierent regions.6 In fact, in some regions, more than half of the coalitions are
oversized. To explain the mechanism of oversized coalitions, I extend the model from a
one-round to a two-round bargaining game. When the game has two rounds, the agenda
setter chooses the group with the larger population size and higher income with which
to form a coalition. This is because the group with the larger population size and higher
income has a lower expected utility when the game proceeds to second round, and thus,
5Kuznets (1955) shows that income inequality increases when countries are in transition from low- to
middle-income. Afterwards, when countries become more economically developed, income inequalities
tend to decrease.
6The number is the average share of countries in the regions.
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its reservation utility is lower in the rst round. In turn, it is easier for the agenda
setter to make an oer to the group with a lower reservation utility. This nding is a
new explanation in the eld for oversized coalitions, which is another contribution of this
paper.
Most theoretical studies predict minimal winning coalitions, but there are some which
predict oversized coalitions similar to this paper. Baron and Diermeier (2001) and Dier-
mier and Merlo (2000) explain that the agenda setter chooses to form a coalition with
a larger population size to extract more rent within the coalitions. On the other hand,
Bandyopadhyay and Oak (2008) show that oversized coalitions occur when the agenda
setter needs to "balance" the policy implemented: Both parties which are on the opposite
ideological ends have to be invited together to set the policy around the point where the
agenda setter prefers. In this regard, this paper tries to give a new viewpoint on oversized
coalitions vis-à-vis the reservation utilities of the partner groups.
There are several empirical studies that report a negative relationship between ethnic
or religious diversity and economic development. The leading papers are by Easterly
and Levine (1997), Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) and Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003). Alesina et al. (2003) extend the measurement
of diversity in society by adding linguistic and religious diversity. Further, Keely and
Tan (2008) empirically show, using the General Social Survey data, that people believe
that the redistribution should be based on race, sex and income class background in the
United States. Their results strongly encourage a theoretical analysis, where the political
parties dier in multi-dimensions.7
There are only a few theoretical studies regarding ethnic diversity. In terms of the
question on how the diversity of people aects economic development, there are two major
theoretical approaches. The rst approach introduces the externalities that arise from
the diversity of people and examines how these externalities aect the welfare of society
or economic growth.8 The second approach analyzes a political game among parties to
implement their preferred policy, as in this paper.
One of the studies categorized in the second approach, Fernandez and Levy (2008),
investigate political equilibrium with diversity in the population and argue that there
would be less redistribution to the poor with a higher degree of diversity. There are some
7In this respect, Roemer (2004) theoretically analyzes political equilibrium with multi-dimensional
preferences. This paper is more specic and elaborates on the stage of government formation.
8For example, Esteban and Ray (1999) introduce externalities and analyze the links between the level
and pattern of conict and the distribution of the groups of people with specic interests.
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limitations in their model. First, their result of a non-monotonic relation between diver-
sity and redistribution depends crucially upon the assumption that there is an exogenous
xed cost to the provision of public goods. Secondly, they assume that rich people are
united, and only the poor people are diversied. In my model, the rich are diversied,
and whether the rich unite or not is endogeneized in the political process of coalition
formation.
Similarly Azzimonti-Renzo (2006) analyzes how a government policy results in an
inecient allocation when there are two opposing political groups which have a conict
over the redistribution allocation, using a recursive formulation with probabilistic voting.
She succeeds in showing the negative relationship between ideological diversity in society
and economic growth, assuming that people vote along their ethnic attributes. In other
words, once the party is chosen in an election, the promised platform is implemented
(direct democracy). This paper analyzes the stage after voting, i.e., political coalition
formation in the legislature.
In the following sections, rst the model and its nding are presented. Secondly,
the extended model, which overcomes the shortcomings of the basic model, is presented.
Finally, the discussion and conclusion follow.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Environment
Let us consider a society with two distinct ethnic groups (A and B), e.g., Amber and
Blue and two income groups, Rich and Poor within each ethnic group A and B i.e.,
there are 4 distinct groups, A and Rich (AR), A and Poor (AP ), B and Rich (BR),
and B and Poor (BP ). Group h ∈ {AR,AP,BR,BP} has a population size n(h),
and within each group, people are assumed to have the same level of per-capita income
Y (h). To analyze the coalition formation, I assume that each group cannot be the majority
alone: 0 < n(h) < 0.5, ∀h. For simplication, the population size of the society and total
income of society Y are normalized to one (
∑
h n(h) = 1;Y =
∑
h n(h)Y (h) = 1).
9
Additionally for simplicity, it is assumed that there is no per-capita income dierence
among the groups in the same class:
9Thus, Y (h) expresses how the income level of group h diers from the average income of society, Y.
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Assumption 1
Y (AR) = Y (BR) = Y (R); Y (AP ) = Y (BP ) = Y (P ).
In the environment described above, a one-round legislative bargaining model is con-
structed following Diermeier and Merlo (2000) or Baron and Diermeier (2001). To im-
plement the preferred policy, the group has to make a coalition with another group to
win a majority in government. Let's call the coalition which enters the government and
implements their preferred policy as the winning coalition.10 The winning coalition im-
plements its preferred policy if it is formed, T (i, j) = {t(i, j), τ(h|i, j)}, for all h. Namely
T (i, j) consists of a common tax rate and transfers along the lines of income class, eth-
nicity or both.
The sequence of legislative bargaining is as follows:
(S1) The agenda setter i chooses a partner group j and makes a policy proposal
T (i, j).11
(S2) Partner j decides if he accepts an oer or not. If he accepts, the game ends, and
a winning coalition is formed with i and j, and T (i, j) would be implemented. If not, the
game proceeds to (S3).
(S3) If a coalition is not formed, no government is formed, the default policy T (q) will
be implemented.
Assumption 2 The agenda setter i satises the following condition:
n(i) + n(j̃) > 0.5 and n(i) + n(ĵ) > 0.5, (1.1)
where j̃ denotes the group which has the same ethnicity as group i, and ĵ denotes the
group which has the same income level as i.
For example, j̃ = AR if i = AP, and ĵ = AR if i = BR. Note that the group which
would be selected as an agenda setter has to belong to the majority group in both lines,
ethnicity and income class; however, it does not have to have a large population size itself.
Interestingly, it can occur that the group with a small population size can be an agenda
setter and thus have strong bargaining power just because it can choose its partner. For
example, even if the population share of group AP is just, say, 5% when A is the majority
10The concept of a winning coalition has been often used in the literature: see Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow (2005), for example.
11In the literature, the agenda setter group i is chosen according to recognition probabilities, which
are the probabilities of each group being chosen as an agenda setter.
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and P is the majority, then group AP would be the agenda setter. Thus, it has strong
bargaining power and will be in the winning coalition all the time if one is formed. This
assumption is made to focus on which partner will be chosen if there is any choice.
Assumption 3 Under the default policy, no tax would be collected, and thus, no
redistribution occurs:
T (q) = {t(i, j) = 0, τ(h|i, j) = 0}, for all h.
With assumption 3, the reservation utility of the partner group j under the default
policy would be:
u(h) = Y (h). (1.2)
For the tractability of the model, the possibility of a consensus government is excluded.12
The budget constraint of the government is:
∑
h
n(h)τ(h |i, j) = Y ·
(









Y is the associated cost of collecting and reallocating the tax13 following
the specication of Bolton and Roland (1997), and n(h)τ(h|i, j) denotes the transfer to
group h.
The preference of the member in group h is described by the following utility function:
u(h|i, j) = (1− t(i, j)) · Y (h) + τ(h|i, j), (1.4)
where t(i, j) is the common at tax rate on income, which is the same for everybody in
the society, and τ(h|i, j) denotes a per-capita transfer to the member group h, which is
group specic. It can be easily seen that the agenda setter, in this case, has no incentives
to provide transfers outside of the coalitions, i.e., the positive transfer is provided only to
the agenda setter and partner group. Thus, I can specify the per capita transfer in the
12By a consensus government, I mean a 3-group coalition which excludes the agenda setter to prevent
the formation of a winning coalition. If I include the possibility of a consensus government, the choice of
partner j would be either to form a coalition with the agenda setter or to be in a consensus government.
However, for further research, admittedly, considering this alternative would make this analysis richer.
13Here the cost of redistribution is dened as a convex function of tax. Of course, one can generalize
the cost c = g(t). However, the convexity of the cost function is assumed to have an interior solution


















Basically, the collected tax minus deadweight loss is divided among the agenda setter
and the partner group, and the proportion of α(i, j) is given to the partner group, and
the rest is taken by the agenda setter group.
Now in the parliament, each political group tries to implement their own preferred
policy, i.e., the policy which maximizes the sum of the utility of the members of its own
group.
The agenda setter i chooses a tax rate, a group-specic transfer or an allocation of the
collected tax between the agenda setter and the partner group invited to form a coalition,
maximizing the utilities of the members in group i:
max
t,α,j
u(i|i, j) = (1− t(i, j))Y (i) + τ(i|i, j) (1.5)
s.t.u(i|i, j) ≥ u(i) (1.6)
u(j|i, j) ≥ u(j) (1.7)
t(i, j) ≥ 0 (1.8)
τ(i|i, j) =






0 ≤ α(i, j) ≤ 1. (1.10)
The rst constraint is for the agenda setter to start the game, i.e., his incentive com-
patibility constraint. The second constraint is for the partner to accept the oer: The
partner gets more than his reservation utility (u(j)) if he accepts the oer. Further, the
tax rate is assumed to be non-negative, and the share of the pie which the partner gets is
assumed to be in the range of 0 to 1 such that both the partner and the ageda setter get
a positive lump-sum transfer. As mentioned above, τ(i|i, j) can be expressed as the part
of the net collected tax, which the agenda setter gets divided among the members of the
agenda setter group. To solve the equilibrium outcome easily, when the agenda setter is
indierent between forming a coalition or does not make an oer and accepts the status
quo, I assume that he forms a coalition. The same logic applies to the second inequality:
If the partner is indierent between accepting the oer and rejecting the oer, he accepts.
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Note that the agenda setter of course can choose the default policy if it is more benecial
for him rather than form a coalition. Note that when the third constraint, t(i, j) ≥ 0 and
u(i|i, j) ≥ Y (i), are satised, the constraint of α ≤ 1 is satised all the time and thus,
redundant.14
1.2.2 The Denition of Equilibrium
Given the population sizes and the income level of each group, n(h) and Y (h) for all h,
an equilibrium is an equilibrium coalition {i∗, j∗}, the equilibrium policy T (i∗, j∗) and
the utilities of members in each group, u(h|i∗, j∗), ∀h, such that
(a) i∗ satises (1.1);
(b) u(j) is given by (1.2); and
(c) j∗ & T (i∗, j∗) solves (1.5)-(1.10).
1.2.3 The Characterization of Equilibrium
We can assume that ethnic group A is the majority in the society without loss of a
generality:
n(AR) + n(AP ) > 0.5.
Assumption 4The agenda setter never forms a coalition with a group with two dierent
attributes.
This assumption is made to focus on answering the question, "which type of coalition
occurs, ethnicity or income class?" If other groups are chosen as an agenda setter, then
the group belongs to the majority in either way, they have only one or no choice for a
possible partner with which to form a winning coalition: For example, if A and the Rich
are in the majority and AP is chosen as an agenda setter, he has only one choice to form
a coalition with AR to win the majority because forming a coalition with BP would not
win the majority. That is why I focus on the case where the agenda setter is the group
which is in the majority either by ethnicity or income class. 15After this assumption is
made, the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 1. The agenda setter prefers to form a coalition with the partner who has
a lower aggregate income (n(j)Y (j)).
14If we assume that t(i, j) ≥ 0 and α > 1, then u(i|i, j) < Y (i), which is a contradiction. Thus, α ≤ 1.
15partner, the principle how he would choose the partner is robust: He choses the group with the
smaller population size and lower income level.
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Proof. See Appendix
The agenda setter basically chooses a partner who has a lower income and whose
population size is smaller so that it is cheaper to persuade him to be a partner in a
winning coalition, because his reservation utility under the default policy is lower than
the group with the higher income and larger population size. In other words, considering
that the agenda setter has to give some proportion, it is easy to agree with the group
that has a lower aggregate income with higher taxation.
The Ethno-linguistic Index (ELF index), constructed by Alesina et al. (2003), mea-
sures the probability of two randomly selected individuals coming from dierent ethnic
or linguistic groups. It suggests that most countries in Africa have a higher value in this
index compared to other parts of the world. In other words, if there is a large number
of dierent ethnic groups, this index would be higher as in the case of Africa. A large
number of ethnic groups means that the population size of each ethnic group tends to
be small. Thus basically, this proposition suggests that in the countries with a higher
ELF index, an ethnic coalition is more likely to be formed because the aggregate income
of each ethnic group is small, which is consistent with most countries in Africa. For ex-
ample, in Kenya, whose ELF index is one of the highest, the largest ethnic group shares
only 22% of the total population, and the other 6 ethnic groups share only a little more
than 5% each. In fact, Miguel and Gugerty (2004) report on how ethnic conict and di-
versity lead to lower public goods provision in Kenya such as school attainment or water
access.16From this proposition, the following corollary can be derived.
Corollary 1. If the poor are in the majority, and the income dierence is suciently
large, a class coalition is likely to be formed. In contrast, if the rich are the majority, and
the income dierence is suciently large, an ethnic coalition is likely to be formed.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rst statement of the corollary answers why we see a class coalition in Latin
American countries where inequality is high, as you can see in Table 1.3, where the
summary statistics of the gini across regions are presented.17 Thus, this corollary partly
16Their results suggest that when the ethnically based coalition enters government, it leads to a policy
oriented, specic ethnic groups, and thus, it leads to a lower provision of constructive public goods.
17Admittedly the income dierence between rich and poor captures only one perspective of the Gini
coecient. It is rather close to the other measurement of inequality, e.g., the income ratio of the top
20% rich and the bottom 20%, which is also used in the Human Development Report by the UNDP.
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explains why we see income class conict in Latin America rather than ethnic conict
(white vs. mestizo vs. indigenous) as Fearon (2005) argues.
On the other hand, the second part of the corollary says that when the rich is the
majority, this relationship between income level dierence and the preferred partner would
be reversed, i.e., as income dierence becomes larger, the ethnic partner is preferred. In
other words, the relationship between income level dierence and coalition formation is
not monotonic. The Kuznets (1955) curve suggests that income inequality and the level
of GDP per capita of the countries should have an inverse-U relationship.
In this regard, Horowitz (1985) argues that in most countries in South Asia, where
income inequality is not so high, we see that ethnically based parties are formed, and
they are usually too strongly rooted in their own ethnicity to make a coalition across
ethnicities, which ts more to the rst part of corollary, i.e., when the poor are in the
majority. Of course, there are some exceptions such as the multi-ethnic coalition in Sri
Lanka as Horowitz discusses in his book. However, usually these coalitions are unstable
and momentary.
So far, I have analyzed the case where income dierence is introduced within ethnic
groups using a legislative bargaining model. It certainly gives a richer analysis compared
to the model with only one dimension of heterogeneity; however, it suggests that ceteris
paribus the coalitions with smaller population sizes are preferred. However in reality, it is
not always true: We often see an oversized coalition. To overcome these shortcomings, I
extend the basic legislative bargaining model such that there are two rounds of bargaining
instead of one round.
1.2.4 The Characterization of Equilibrium  Extended Model
In this section, I show a model with two-round legislative bargaining. Basically if the
agenda setter is rejected in the rst round, he could go to another possible partner and
make the oer to form a coalition. The sequence of the game in this case is the following:
Sequence of the game
(S1) The agenda setter i is determined and decides whether to start the game or not:
The agenda setter is the group who belongs to the majority along either line, ethnicity
or income class.
(S2) The agenda setter chooses the partner j1 with whom to form a coalition and
makes the oer T1(i, j1) = {t1(i, j1), τ1(h|i, j1)}, for all h, where t is the tax rate, and
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τ1 is the group specic per capita transfer in the rst round.
(S3) If j1 accepts, the winning coalition is formed and it enters the government to
implement their preferred policy T1.
(S4) If j1 rejects, the agenda setter chooses another partner with whom to form a
coalition j2 and makes the oer T2(i, j2) = {t2(i, j2), τ2(h|i, j2)}, for all h,
(S5) If j2 accepts, the winning coalition is formed, and implements their preferred
policy, T2.
(S6) If j2 rejects, no government is formed, and the status quo q is implemented.
Note that the lower subscript of the variables expresses the order of the round of the
game. The maximization problem of the agenda setter is as expressed in (4). The only
dierence between the rst round and second round is the outside option of the partner
and the agenda setter, i.e., the reservation utilities, u(j) and u(i), dier. In the second
round, the agenda setter oers a partner such that the partner is as well o as his outside
optionstatus quo policy. On the other hand, in the rst round, the rservation utility
of the partner is the value funciton when he is outside of the winning coalition: The
reservation utility for the ethnic (income class) partner (e.g. if i=AR, ethnic partner is
AP) is the value function when he rejects the oer of the agenda setter, and the game
goes to the second round, where the winning coalition between the agenda setter and
class (ethnic) partner is formed. The reservation utility of the agenda setter, on the other
hand, is the value function when he forms a coalition with the dierent partner from that
in the rst round. Specically, the reservation utility of the ethnic partner in the rst
round is:
u1(j1) = u2(j1|i, j2)
= (1− t2(i, j2))Y (j1), j2 6= j1,
and the reservation utility of the agenda setter is:
u1(i) = u2(i|i, j2)
= (1− t2(i, j2))Y (i) +






, j2 6= j1.
Lemma 1. When there are two rounds of legislative bargaining, and when the tax rate is
strictly positive, the equilibrium tax rate and share of the pie in the second round are:
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t∗2(i


















So now, we know that in the second round, the agenda setter oers T ∗2 (i
∗, j∗2) =
{t∗2(i∗, j∗2), τ2(h|i∗, j∗2)} for all h.
Lemma 2. When there are two rounds of legislative bargaining, and when the tax rate is
strictly positive, the equilibrium tax rate and share of the pie the partner gets are:
t1(i



















∗, j∗1) = t2(i
∗, j∗2) = 1− n(i∗)Y (i∗)− n(j∗2)Y (j∗2),
α1(i
∗, j∗1)) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2. In the game where there are two rounds of legislative bargaining, when
the tax rate is strictly positive, and the agenda setter strictly prefers to join the game, the
agenda setter chooses a partner whose income level is higher and whose population size
is larger in the rst round:
j1 = j̃ if n(j̃)Y (j̃) > n(ĵ)Y (ĵ),
and
j1 = ĵ if n(j̃)Y (j̃) < n(ĵ)Y (ĵ).
Proof. See Appendix.
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In the literature of political coalition formation, it has been often argued why we
see oversized coalitions even though theory suggests that a coalition should be formed
with a minimal winning coalition. Actually, Sjölin (1993), Volden and Carrubba (2004)
and many others show that in reality, it often happens that the coalition formations in
developed countries such as Denmark and Sweden are not minimal winning coalitions, i.e.,
the agenda setter has a chance to choose a partner group with a small population size, but
it chooses a partner with a large population size. Interestingly, this phenomenon occurs
not only at the country level but also at the local government level. For example, Soren,
Skjaveland, and Blom-Hansen (2008) show that in the election of the local government
in Denmark, oversized coalitions were also seen, which they could not explain within the
logic of existing theoretical studies.
On the other hand, there are few theoretical papers trying to explain the mechanisms
of oversized governments.18 For example, similarly to this paper, Baron and Diermeier
(2001) also construct a legislative bargaining model to analyze why oversized or minority
governments can form. However, the main dierence between this paper and theirs is
that in their model, the oversized government is caused by an extreme status quo policy.
In contrast, in this paper, the coalition with the larger population size can be preferred
when the rich are the majority because the rich prefer lower taxes and less deadweight
cost for redistribution. As argued in Volden and Carruba (2004), there are others who
try to investigate the mechanisms of an oversized coalition. However, none of the existing
studies' arguments for oversized coalitions are similar to this paper, and thus, this paper
brings new insights.
1.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the eect of income distribution and ethnic diversity on political
coalition formation and government scal policy, constructing two types of legislative
bargaining models.
In the basic model, the agenda setter chooses the partner group which has the lower
income level and a smaller population size, in other words, the lower aggregate income,
because it is cheaper to persuade the group to be a partner in a winning coalition. As
the income level dierence between the rich and poor increases, I nd that when the poor
18Volden and Carrubba (2004) have a nice review of the existing theories, which try to explain why
oversized coalitions can be formed, and they empirically test these theories.
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are the majority, a class coalition is more likely to occur.
The extended model brings a new explanation for oversized coalitions to the literature:
why we see oversized coalitions in reality contrary to what the theory of minimal winning
claims. When the group is large in population size and has a high income level, it has
a lower reservation utility if the outside option is determined by the pay-o of a second
round to the game. The larger its population size and the higher its income level, the
group becomes worse o in the second round of the game, being outside of the coalition,
because it pays higher taxes as a group if outside of the winning coalition.
Here, ethnicity is loosely dened as something which unites people apart from income
level. Thus, this model can be extended to analyze the eect of religious, linguistic, or
even the geographical dierences among people. However, I exclude the possibility of a
consensus government from the model: a "loose" coalition formed solely to prevent the
agenda setter from forming a winning coalition. For a further extension, one can include
this possibility to enrich the analysis. Some of the empirical ndings still have not been
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Proof of Proposition 1. In this case, the value function of the agenda setter would be
u(i∗) = (1− t(i∗, j∗))Y (i∗) +






where 1−α is the proportion of the net tax revenue which the agenda setter gets from the
incentive compatibility constraint of the partner group which binds in this case, because
if it does not bind, the agenda setter all the time has an incentive to decrease α, until it
binds.
u(j∗) = u(j∗) (A2)
⇔ (1− t(i∗, j∗))Y (j∗) +
















After substituting A2 into A1, and taking the rst-order condition of (1.5), this gives us
the equilibrium tax rate:
t(i∗, j∗) =
Y − n(i∗)Y (i∗)− n(j∗)Y (j∗)
Y
> 0. (A3)
Further, the proportion the partner gets is:
α(i∗, j∗) =
t(i∗, j∗)Y (j∗)n(j∗)




The utility dierence of the agenda setter in this case and under the status quo policy
is:









(1− n(i∗)Y (i∗)− Y (j∗)n(j∗)− 1− n(i







Thus, the agenda setter is better o. α(i∗, j∗) is such that the partner is indierent
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between this case and the status quo policy, and thus, it is shown that the solution
satises all the constraints.
On the other hand, the utility dierence of the agenda setter when the partner has
the same ethnic attribute, and when the partner belongs to the same income group is
dened by
∆ = u(i∗|i∗, j̃∗ )− u(i∗|i∗, ĵ∗),
which implies
∆ = −(t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗))Y (i∗)
+














t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗)
n(i∗)
(−n(i∗)Y (i∗) + 1− t(i




∗, j̃∗ )n(j̃∗ )Y (j̃∗ ) + t(i∗, ĵ∗)n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗)
n(i∗)
. (A4)
where t(i∗, j̃∗ ) denotes the equilibrium tax rate when the agenda setter chooses an ethnic
partner, and t(i∗, ĵ∗) denotes the tax rate when the partner belongs to the same income
group as the agenda setter. Now I try to decompose the second term. Note that
t(i∗, j̃∗ ) = 1− n(i∗)Y (i∗)− n(j̃∗)Y (j̃∗)
= n(k)Y (k) + n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗), k 6= i∗, j̃∗, ĵ∗,
and
t(i∗, ĵ∗) = 1− n(i∗)Y (i∗)− n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗)
= n(k)Y (k) + n(j̃∗)Y (j̃∗),
where k is the group which is outside of the coalition all the time, k 6= i∗, j̃∗, ĵ∗.
Thus,
t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗) = n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗)− n(j̃∗)Y (j̃∗),
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and
t(i∗, j̃∗ ) + t(i∗, ĵ∗) = 2n(k)Y (k) + n(j̃∗)Y (j̃∗) + n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗), k 6= i∗, j̃∗, ĵ∗.
So, at the end, the second term of A4 becomes
−t(i
∗, j̃∗ )n(j̃∗ )Y (j̃∗ ) + t(i∗, ĵ∗)n(ĵ∗)Y (, ĵ∗)
n(i∗)
=









(t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗)), k 6= i∗, j̃∗, ĵ∗.
Thus substituting back the expression into A4 would give us:
∆ =
t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗)
n(i∗)
(−n(i∗)Y (i∗) + 1− t(i




t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗)
n(i∗)
(1− n(i∗)Y (i∗)− n(j̃
∗)Y (j̃∗) + n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗)
2
),
which is positive if and only if t(i∗, j̃∗ )− t(i∗, ĵ∗) > 0⇔ n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗) > n(j̃∗)Y (j̃∗).
In sum,
∆ > 0 i n(ĵ∗)Y (ĵ∗) > n(j̃∗)Y (j̃∗).
Proof of Corollary 1. The condition of Proposition 1, when the ethnic partner is preferred















It is quite obvious that as the income dierence becomes larger, this condition is
unlikely to be satised.







and it is quite obvious that as the income dierence becomes larger, an ethnic coalition
would be preferred.
Proof of Lemma1. To nd sub-game, perfect equilibrium, I solve the game by backward
induction. In this case, the value function of the agenda setter would be
u2(i
∗) = (1− t2(i∗, j∗2))Y (i∗) +







where α2 is the proportion of the net tax revenue which the agenda setter gets from the
incentive compatibility constraint of the partner group which binds in this case, because



































































































It is shown above that the agenda setter is better o forming a coalition in the second
round than being under the default policy, and thus, chooses to form a coalition in the
second round.
Proof of Lemma 2. Lagrangian of the rst round of the game is:
L = u1(i|i, j1)+λ1(u1(i|i, j1)−Y (i))+λ2(u1(j1|i, j1)−u(j1))+λ3t1(i, j1)+λ4α1(i, j1)
(A7)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
Lt1 = −Y (i) +
(1− α1(i, j1))(1− t1(i, j1))
n(i)
+ λ1(−Y (i) +




α1(i, j1)(1− t1(i, j1))
n(j)
) + λ3 ≤ 0, (A8)






















+ λ4 ≤ 0, (A10)
Lα1 · α1(i, j1) = 0, (A11)
Lλ1 = −(t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (i)
+






Lλ1 · λ1 = 0, (A13)
Lλ2 = −(t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (j) +







Lλ2 · λ2 = 0, (A15)
Lλ3 = t1(i, j1) ≥ 0, (A16)
Lλ3 · λ3 = 0, (A17)
Lλ4 = α1(i, j1) ≥ 0, (A18)
Lλ4 · λ4 = 0 (A19)
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λ4 ≥ 0, (A20)
where ĵ is the income class partner of i.
1. when α1(i, j1) = 0,






















= 0, then t1(i, j1) = 0 or 2.
In this case, Lα1 = λ4 ≤ 0, on the other hand, from (A20) λ4 ≥ 0, and thus
λ4 = 0
i. when t1(i, j1) = 0
(A15) becomes Lλ2 = t2(i, j2)Y (j2) > 0⇔ λ2 = 0




n(i)Y (i))+λ3, which is strictly positive, given (A20) and 1−n(i)Y (i) > 0.
However, this does not satisfy the condition (A8) so this is not a solution.
ii. when t1(i, j1) = 2
In this case, (A14) becomes Lλ2 = −(2 + t2(i, j2)Y (j2) which is strictly
negative, given that t2(i, j2) = 1 − n(i)Y (i) − n(j2)Y (j2),which is a con-
tradiction to condition (A14), so this is not the solution.
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Lλ3 = t1(i, j1) > 0⇔ λ3 = 0
Lt1 = −Y (i) +
(1−t1(i,j1))
n(i)
+ λ1(−Y (i) + (1−t1(i,j1))n(i) ) + λ2(−Y (j1)) = 0,








Lλ2 = −(t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (j1) ≥ 0


















+ λ4 ≤ 0,
i. When t1(i, j1) > t2(i, j2), then Lλ2 < 0. So this is not a solution.
ii. When t1(i, j1) < t2(i, j2), then λ2 = 0




⇔ t1(i, j1) = 1− n(i)Y (i) > t2(i, j2),
so this is not a solution.
iii. When t1(i, j1) = t2(i, j2)
(A8) becomes Lt1 = (1 + λ1)(−Y (i) +
(1−t2(i,j2))
n(i)
) + λ2(−Y (j1)) = (1 +
λ1)n(j1)Y (j1) + λ2(−Y (j1)) = 0
⇔ λ2 = (1 + λ1)n(j1).




which satises the conditions.
Solution: t1(i∗, j∗1) = t2(i
∗, j∗2) = 1− n(i∗)Y (i∗)− n(j∗2)Y (j∗2)
α1(i
∗, j∗1) = 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 = (1 + λ1)n(j∗1), λ3 = 0, λ4 ≥ 0.
2 When α1 > 0,
then Lλ4 > 0, which implies λ4 = 0 and since Lα1· α1 = 0 and α1 > 0, then Lα1 = 0.




= 0, then t1(i, j1) = 0 or 2. Lα1 = λ4 = 0.
i. When t1(i, j1) = 0, Lλ2 = t2(i, j2)Y (j2) > 0⇔ λ2 = 0.
Lt1 = −Y (i) +
(1−α1(i,j1))
n(i)
+ λ1(−Y (i) + 1−α1(i,j1)n(i) ) + λ3 ≤ 0




so this is not a solution.
ii. when t1(i, j1) = 2, then Lλ3 > 0⇔ λ3 = 0 .
In this case, Lλ2 = −(2 + t2(i, j2))Y (j2) < 0, which is a contradiction, so this
is not the solution
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> 0 then Lλ3 > 0⇔ λ3 = 0




























On the other hand, since t(i, j1) > 0, (A8) becomes
Lt1 = −Y (i) +
(1− α(i, j1))(1− t1(i, j1))
n(i)
+ λ1(−Y (i) +




α1(i, j1)(1− t1(i, j1))
n(j1)
) = 0
⇔ (1 + λ1)
λ2
= −
−Y (j1) + α1(i,j1)(1−t1(i,j1))n(j)







−Y (j1) + α(i,j1)(1−t1(i,j1))n(j)
−Y (i) + (1−α1(i,j1))(1−t1(i,j1))
n(i)
⇔ −n(i)Y (i) + (1− α1(i, j1))(1− t1(i, j1)) = n(j1)Y (j1)− α1(i, j1)(1− t1(i, j1))
⇔ t1(i, j1) = 1− n(i)Y (i)− n(j1)Y (j1).
i. When λ2 = 0, then
(A8) becomes
Lt1 = −Y (i) +
(1−α1(i,j1))(1−t1(i,j1))
n(i)
+ λ1(−Y (i) + (1−α1(i,j1))(1−t1(i,j1))n(i) ) = 0
since t1(i, j1) > 0
⇔ λ1 = −1 < 0, which does not satisfy the conditions, so this is not a
solution.
ii. When λ2 > 0, then (A14) becomes
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Lλ2 = −(t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (j1) +







⇔ α1(i, j1)(t1(i, j1)−
t21(i, j1)
2
) = (t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (j1).
(A) When λ1 > 0, then (A12) implies
Lλ1 = −(t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (i)
+






In other words, the incentive constraint of the agenda setter binds. In this
case, the value function of the agenda setter is:
u1(i|i, j1) = u2(i|j2).
However, this case is apparently dominated by the solution in the case
1b(iii), where the agenda setter is strictly better o than in the second
round, and thus, this is not a solution.

















Lt1 = −Y (i) +




α1(i, j1)(1− t1(i, j1))
n(j1)
) = 0
⇔ n(i)Y (i)− (1− α1(i, j1))(1− t1(i, j1)) = −n(j)Y (j) + α1(i, j)(1− t1(i, j1))
⇔ t1(i, j1) = 1− n(i)Y (i)− n(j1)Y (j1).
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) = (t1(i, j1)−t2(i, j2))Y (j1)n(j1).
Note that to satisfy the constraint of α1(i, j1) > 0, this solution is plausible
only when t1(i, j1) > t2(i, j2)⇔ n(j2)Y (j2) > n(j1)Y (j1).
Now, we have 2 solution candidates, 2(b)(ii)(B)- t1(i, j1) = 1−n(i)Y (i)−n(j1)Y (j1), α1(i, j1)(t1(i, j1)−
t21(i,j1)
2
) = (t1(i, j1)− t2(i, j2))Y (j1)n(j1) and 1(b)(iii)- t1(i, j1) = t2(i, j2) = 1−n(i)Y (i)−
n(j2)Y (j2), α1(i, j1) = 0, and the expected utility dierence of the agenda setter in the
case of 2(b)(ii)(B) is all the time larger than 1(b)(iii). However, 2(b)(ii)(B) is plausible
only when t1(i, j1) = t2(i, j2).
So to sum up,




) = (t1(i, j1)−t2(i, j2))Y (j1)n(j1)
when n(j2)Y (j2) > n(j1)Y (j1),
t1(i, j1) = 1− n(i)Y (i)− n(j2)Y (j2), α1(i, j1) = 0 otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2. If we dene the utility dierence of the agenda setter when he
chooses the ethnic partner as a partner to form a coalition and an income class partner
as a partner for the coalition when n(̂i)Y (̂i) > n(̃i)Y (̃i):
∆ ≡ u1(i|i, ĩ)− u1(i|i, î)
= (1− t1(i, ĩ))Y (i) +













{t1(i, ĩ) = t1(i, î)}
= −







Thus, the ethnic partner is preferred in case of n(̂i)Y (̂i) > n(̃i)Y (̃i). On the other
hand, when n(̂i)Y (̂i) < n(̃i)Y (̃i),
∆ ≡ u1(i|i, ĩ)− u1(i|i, î)







− (1− t1(i, î))Y (i)−















In the case of n(̂i)Y (̂i) < n(̃i)Y (̃i), the class partner is preferred, and thus, the summary




Table 1.1: Coalition Type across Regions (1975-2006)
Region Non-economic Coalition Share (%) # Obs.
1975-1990 1991-2006 1975-2006
The Middle East and Africa 64.7 76.9 73.5 75
Latin America and the Caribbean 33.9 69.1 55.2 268
East Asia and Pacic 80.4 69.3 72.9 65
South Asia 84.4 64.5 63.1 53
Europe (non-high income) and Central Asia 40.0 77.8 76.6 225
OECD and High-Income Countries 47.4 46.5 46.8 849
Total 54.2 65.2 50.2 1527
Note: Single party government is excluded from the sample.
Data source: DPI2006, Database of Political Institutions, World Bank Research Group
Table 1.2: The Share of Oversized Coalitions (1975-2006)
Region Oversized Coalition Share (%) # Obs
1975-1990 1991-2006 1975-2006
The Middle East and Africa 56.1 61.5 60.4 378
Latin America and the Caribbean 57.6 45.8 48.4 223
East Asia and Pacic 41.4 55.2 51.4 179
South Asia 22.2 34.4 28.3 256
Europe (non-high income) and Central Asia 20.0 31.8 31.8 179
OECD and high income countries 32.9 26.1 29.5 651
Total 39.5 41.0 40.8 1866
Note: The samples consist of coalition governments.
Data source: DPI2006, Database of Political Institutions, World Bank Research Group
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Table 1.3: The Gini Coecients across Regions (1975-2006)
Region Income inequality - Gini coecients # Obs
1975-1990 1991-2006 1975-2006
Sub-Saharan Africa 52.7 51.4 52.1 226
Latin America and the Caribbean 54.9 55.8 55.4 331
East Asia & Pacic 31.8 39.3 35.4 32
South Asia 35.5 30.0 33.5 25
Europe (non-high income) and Central Asia 38.9 40.9 40.0 401
OECD and high income countries 30.2 30.6 30.4 1043
Total 37.9 39.0 38.5 2058
Note: The unit of observation is country x year.





Sever Punishment in the Courtroom: Evidence
from Truth-in-Sentencing Laws
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Abstract
We investigate the behavioral responses of judges and prosecutors to more severe
punishments by analyzing the eects of Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) laws in a large
sample of criminal cases in the U.S. The TIS laws raised the severity of punishment
by requiring oenders to serve at least 85 percent of their imposed sentences in
prison. Dierences between the U.S. states in the timing of adoption and the types
of crimes covered provide a source of identication. The key ndings are: (1) The
TIS laws reduced the probability that an arrested oender is eventually convicted
by 9 percent through an increase in the probability that the case is dismissed, a
reduction in the probability that the defendant pleads guilty, and a reduction in the
probability that the defendant is convicted at trial. (2) The TIS laws reduced the
imposed sentence that a defendant can expect upon arrest by 8 percent. (3) These
eects were more pronounced for crimes that were not the primary target of the
TIS law, i.e., non-violent crimes.




Laws that impose more severe punishments on criminals sometimes bring unexpected
consequences. Their direct objectiveto deter and incapacitate oenders by keeping
them longer in prisonmay be mitigated by behavioral responses of judges, jurors, and
prosecutors who exercise a certain amount of discretion at various stages of the criminal
procedure. Judges and jurors may become more reluctant to convict, judges may impose a
shorter sentence, and prosecutors may adjust their plea bargaining tactics. Understand-
ing the character and empirical magnitude of the behavioral responses has important
policy implications. Since legislators cannot fully control the choices of judges, jurors,
and prosecutors, they should take the mitigating responses into account when designing
sentencing policies. Legislating longer sentences may be undesirable both on the grounds
of eciency as well as fairness if the mitigating responses are large enough.
This paper presents evidence on mitigating responses by evaluating the eects of the
so-called Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) laws on the outcomes of criminal cases. The TIS
laws, adopted by many U.S. states during the 1990s, require convicted oenders to serve
at least 85 percent of their imposed prison sentence. This implies a stark increase in the
fraction of the sentence served compared to the 1980s and early 1990s when prisoners
served 48 percent on average (Ditton and Wilson 1999), mostly due to discretionary early
release by parole ocers and by prison overcrowding. If the probability of conviction and
the imposed sentences had not changed after introducing the TIS laws, an oender could
spend 70 percent more time in prison than previously expected.
Several states such as Utah and the federal government imposed TIS-type require-
ments prior to the 1990s (U.S. Department of Justice, 1993). The Federal Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 19941 encourages more states to adopt such pro-
visions by introducing the so-called Violent Oenders Incarceration and the Truth-in-
Sentencing Incentive Grant Program. To be eligible for the TIS grant, a state has to
implement a TIS law that requires oenders convicted of a Part I violent crime2 to serve
no less than 85 percent of the sentence imposed, or a similar law that eectively resulted
in such oenders serving on average at least 85 percent of the sentence.3
The timing of adoption of the TIS laws by individual states varied (see Table 2.1).
While only two states (plus the District of Columbia) had TIS-type provisions in the
1Public Law 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994 (the 1994 Crime Act).
2Part I violent crime includes murder, rape, robbery, and assault.
3For more detail on the criteria, see the U.S. Department of Justice (2005).
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early 1990s, eleven other states adopted the TIS laws within one year of the passage of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Twenty-seven states and
the District of Columbia met the eligibility criteria by 1998.4 The states also varied in the
scope of coverage of the TIS laws; the 85 percent requirement applied to Part I violent
felonies in all adopting states, but in some states it applied to other crimes as well.
The variation among the states in the timing of adoption and the types of crime
covered allows for an identication of the eects of the TIS laws on case outcomes by a
dierence-in-dierences-in-dierences estimator. The data setState Court Processing
Statistics (SCPS)consists of a large sample of felony cases from the most populous
counties in the United States and allows a control for many observable characteristics in
each case.
The paper contributes to the empirical literature on behavioral responses in criminal
procedure in several ways. First, it captures the various margins of responses in the
criminal justice process in two simple summary measures. One measure is the change in
the probability that an arrested oender is eventually convicted, irrespective of whether
at trial or by pleading guilty. Indeed, we nd that it fell by 9 percent. The other
measure is the change in the imposed sentence that an arrested oender receives at the
nal disposition of the case, which is either the actual sentence imposed on a convicted
defendant or a zero sentence imposed on an oender that is not convicted. It gives a
particularly useful summary of the behavioral responses as the changes in the probability
of dismissal, guilty plea, conviction at trial, and the sentence imposed upon conviction
are reected into the sentence that is ultimately imposed. It can also be interpreted as a
change in the sentence that an oender can expect conditional on arrest. The TIS laws
reduced the imposed sentence conditional on arrest by 8 percent according to our most
preferred specications.
The behavioral responses mitigated the intended eect of the TIS laws to impose more
severe punishment. In the absence of behavioral responses, the sentence actually served,
conditional on arrest, would have increased by 70 percent on average. As the sentence
imposed, conditional on arrest, fell by 8 percent, the sentence that an arrested oender
can expect actually to serve increased not by 70 percent but by "only" 56 percent.5
4These states received $2.7 billion in total during 1996-2001 through the VOI/TIS grant program
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2005).
5The expected sentence actually served was 50 percent of the sentence imposed upon conviction times
the probability of being convicted prior to the adoption of the TIS laws. In the absence of behavioral
responses, it would rise to 85 percent, a 70-percent increase. The behavioral responses reduced the
product of the sentence and the probability by 8 percent. Hence, the new sentence actually served,
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Therefore, the unintended behavioral responses removed about one-fth of the intended
increase in the severity of punishment. The mitigating responses are empirically relevant
and need to be taken into account when designing of sentencing policies.
Second, the paper provides one of the rst empirical tests of Andreoni's (1991) propo-
sition that more severe punishment should lead to a lower probability of conviction. While
the proposition is widely accepted as theory, empirical evidence has been scant at best.
We identied only two empirical studies using data on actual cases. Snyder (1990) nds
a reduction in the probability of conviction in antitrust cases as the level of charges for
certain antitrust violations was raised from misdemeanor to felony. Bjerk (2005), who
explores primarily the response of prosecutors to the three-strikes laws, also tests whether
oenders qualifying for a third-strike oense face a lower probability of conviction at trial
but does not nd any signicant eect.6 We do nd a signicant decrease in the overall
probability that an arrested defendant is convicted. Further, when investigating the par-
ticular channels behind this overall eect, we nd that TIS laws reduce the probability
of conviction through a higher probability that the case is dismissed, lower the proba-
bility that the defendant pleads guilty, and, to a lesser extent, the lower probability of
conviction at trial.
Third, the paper adds new results to the empirical literature on the behavioral re-
sponses of prosecutors. One line of the literature nds that prosecutors "exploit" en-
hanced statutory sentences, consistently with models of the prosecutors that maximize
the total punishment imposed. Kuziemko (2006) shows that defendants in murder cases
in New York were accepting plea bargains with harsher terms after the state reintroduced
the death penalty in 1995, while the likelihood that the defendant would plead guilty did
not change. Kessler and Piehl (1998) nd that California's Proposition 8, a popular
initiative that mandated enhanced sentences for oenders with certain criminal histories
caused an increase in sentences for those crimes that were subject to Proposition 8 as
well as for crimes that were factually similar but were not subject to Proposition 8.
Another line of the literature instead nds that the prosecutors mitigate enhanced
conditional on arrest, increased to 78 percent (92 percent of 85), which is 56 percent higher than the
pre-TIS law level.
6Bjerk's result may plausibly be explained by sample selection. The three-strikes laws made it more
likely that a felony defendant with two prior strikes would have charges reduced to a misdemeanor
(resulting in cases with relatively stronger evidence being prosecuted as felonies) and that he would not
accept the plea bargain (resulting in cases with relatively stronger evidence being continued to trial).
The shift in the distribution of cases reaching trial shifts the probability of conviction upward, osetting
the predicted behavioral response.
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statutory sentences, which is rather consistent with the view that prosecutors use their
discretion to apply broader social norms of justice and fairness in punishment. Bjerk
(2005) studies the impact of the three-strikes laws which dramatically enhanced prison
sentences for criminals with at least two prior violent felony convictions. The prosecutors
became more likely to reduce the charge from felony to misdemeanor when the defendant
was at risk of receiving a three-strike sentence. Walsh (2004) documents that between 25-
45 percent of oenders eligible for a three-strike sentence in urban counties in California
have their prior strikes dismissed.7
According to our ndings, the probability that the defendant would plead guilty de-
creased by 10 percent, and the probability that the prosecutors would reduce charges
from felony to misdemeanor decreased by 4 percent. Pleading guilty apparently became
a less favorable alternative to trial; these ndings rather support the "exploiting" view
of the prosecutors.
Fourth, the paper provides interesting results on the heterogeneity of the responses.
The TIS laws are designed primarily to punish violent criminals more severely, although
about one third of the states apply them to non-violent crimes as well. The behavioral
responses to the TIS laws are more pronounced for non-violent crimes, i.e., those crimes
at which the laws were not primarily targeted. Judges and prosecutors appear to respond
more strongly when the actual content of the law deviates from its stated objectives.8
Last, the paper also provides several policy-relevant ndings about the eects of the
TIS laws themselves. So far, Shepherd (2002) has analyzed their deterrence eects. Using
a county-level panel, she estimates the eect of the TIS laws on crime rates, arrest rates,
and the median prison sentences. She nds that the arrest rates increased with the
introduction of TIS laws as the states that introduced the TIS laws tended to adopt
a "tough on crime" attitude, and the police made more eort to arrest. Similarly she
nds an increase in the imposed prison sentences. Her estimates can be interpreted as
evidence of judges and prosecutors not osetting an increase in the severity of punishment;
7The ndings by Bjerk (2005) and Walsh (2004) can alternatively be rationalized as an optimal
response by prosecutors who maximize the average sentence or number of convictions at trial subject to
the resource constraint. Realizing that the judge or jury will be very reluctant to convict a defendant
with two prior strikes when the punishment for the third-strike oense is deemed too severe (typically
a situation when the third strike is relatively a petty crime), the prosecutor anticipates that winning
the case would require substantial resources that would no longer be available for other cases. Oering
"softer" terms to the defendant is then optimal even for a prosecutor who maximizes the average sentence
and does not necessarily indicate an intentional objective to mitigate very long sentences.
8Such a selective response is presumably possible only if the judges and prosecutors share the stated
objective of the legislation, which apparently is the case with the TIS laws (Shepherd, 2002).
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alternatively, they can be interpreted as evidence of other "tough on crime" policies that
were correlated with the adoption of the TIS laws. Our empirical strategy diers from
that of Shepherd; we use case-level as opposed to county-level data and our "dierence-
in-dierences-in-dierences" estimator allows us to control for the unobservable "tough
on crime" policies. In addition, we provide new ndings of a substantial reduction in the
probability of conviction and an overall reduction in the sentence imposed conditional on
arrest.Our other ndings, namely the reduction in the plea rate and an overall increase in
the sentences imposed upon conviction, generally concur with those of Shepherd. Owens
(2010), using the same data set as we do, detects a particular response to the TIS laws
in the criminal procedurepeople who were arrested for an oense covered by the TIS
law but pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor (to which the TIS requirement does not apply)
were punished with relatively harsher sentences. Our paper instead evaluates the impact
of the TIS laws on the overall punitiveness of the criminal justice process on a broader
range of case outcomes.
2.2 Theoretical predictions
This section discusses the behavioral responses to the TIS laws predicted by the theoret-
ical literature. Simple expressions of measurable case outcomes organize our thinking:
SS = SC · f (2.1)
E[SS|arrest] = p · SC · f =
(
p · SC + (1− p) · 0
)
· f = SA · f. (2.2)
The punishment suered by a convicted defendant is the sentence actually served in
prison SS, which is a product of the sentence imposed upon conviction SC and the fraction
of the sentence that is actually served f . The expected punishment facing an arrested
defendant is the expected sentence actually served in prison E[SS|arrest], which in turn,
is the product of the probability p that he is convicted (conditional on arrest), the sentence
imposed if convicted, and the fraction actually served. The sentence if not convicted is,
of course, zero. Adding the outcome under non-conviction to the expression in equation
2.2 shows straightforwardly that the expected sentence actually served in prison can
also be stated as the expected sentence imposed (conditional on arrest) SA multiplied
by the fraction of the sentence served. The variable SA summarizes adjustments in the
probability and the sentence into a single measure of punishment that is produced as an
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"output" of the criminal procedure.
TIS laws exogenously shifted the fraction f upwards by a certain percentage, and
they would have, ceteris paribus, mechanically increased the expected sentence actually
served E[SS|arrest] by that same percentage. However, the probability of conviction and
the sentence upon conviction are determined endogenously, and as a result, E[SS|arrest]
may have increased by less than the mechanical change. We estimate how the variables
that are determined inside the courtroom, p , SC , and SA, respond to a change in f . (We
unfortunately cannot estimate the eect of the TIS laws on E[SS|arrest]since the data
on prison releases do not cover enough years after the adoption of the laws.)
The predicted eect of the TIS laws on the probability of conviction follows a well-
known model by Andreoni (1991). As the sentence actually served in prison increases,
the social cost of convicting an innocent defendant also increases. The judge or jury
who cares about the social costs of wrongful conviction then requires a higher standard
of proof to convict a defendant.9 The conviction rate among the cases resolved at trial
should therefore fall. A similar trade-o may operate at other stages of the criminal
procedure, such as the decision whether to dismiss a case.
In the plea bargaining process, changes in case outcomes reect behavioral responses
of the prosecutor (the terms of the plea bargain he oers) and the defendant (willingness
to accept the terms). The predicted eects also depend on a particular model of the
prosecutor, where the existing literature oers two broad views: According to one, the
prosecutors are maximizing a well-dened deterrence objective, such as the total pun-
ishment imposed.10 According to another, they pursue broader objectives of justice and
fairness and apply punishment in accordance with these objectives.11 Even though some
predictions are ambiguous, certain observed eects of the TIS laws allow us to discrim-
inate between these alternative views. A reduction in the plea rate is predicted by the
"maximizing" view of the prosecutors, while an increase is possible under both views.
A decrease in the probability that the prosecutor reduces charges is predicted by the
"maximizing" view and an increase by the "justice-pursuing" view.
In the "maximizing" models of the prosecutorial behavior, the prosecutor typically
oers a sentence that makes the defendant indierent between accepting the plea or going
9Ezra and Wickelgren (2005) reach the same prediction in an alternative model where the population
of defendants is endogenous.
10Landes (1971), Easterbrook (1983), and Reinganum (1988, 2000).
11Miceli 1996.
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to trial.12 If the TIS law applies irrespective of whether the defendant pleads guilty or is
convicted at trial, the sentence to be actually served SS rises mechanically as f increases
for both trial and plea convictions. The prosecutor then need not adjust the imposed
sentence SC to make the defendant indierent.13 However, pleading guilty frequently
implies being convicted of less severe charges compared to a potential conviction at trial.
In such situations, the TIS laws may apply under the trial conviction but need not apply
under the plea conviction. A maximizing prosecutor should then oer a longer sentence
SC or be less likely to reduce the charges. The prosecutor essentially "exploits" the
increased gap between the actual sentence served under trial and under the plea and
oers the defendant less favorable terms in the plea bargain.
The predicted impact on the defendants' plea choice is theoretically ambiguous. On
the one hand, they would be more likely to plead guilty if the TIS law applies only to
the trial sentence. However, if the prosecutors oer tougher bargains because of the TIS
laws, the plea rate may fall. Likewise, the defendants would be less likely to accept the
plea if they take into account that the probability of conviction at trial decreases.
In the "justice-pursuing" view of the prosecutors, the prosecutors may regard the
increase in f as a departure from the prevailing norms of justice and use their discretion
to mitigate its impact. They would then oer a shorter sentence SC and be more likely to
reduce charges. As a result, the defendants should be more likely to accept plea bargains.
In the sentencing stage, the judges may oset a higher fraction of the sentence actually
served in prison simply by imposing shorter sentences. This would be particularly the case
if they regard the mandated increase in the fraction of the sentence served as unjust.14
The preceding discussion of the particular behavioral responses implies predictions for
the sign of our summary measures. The overall probability p that an arrested oender is
convicted (by pleading guilty or at trial) is expected most likely to fall, although there is
a theoretical possibility that it could rise if the prosecutors are mitigating the increased
12If the oenders are of dierent types (e.g., when they have imperfect information about the strength
of evidence against them) and the prosecutor cannot distinguish their type, the optimal sentence oered
involves only a marginal defendant being indierent between the plea and trial: While defendants who
think the case against them is weak strictly prefer a trial, those who think the case against them is strong
strictly prefer pleading guilty.
13Whether he would optimally adjust the oered sentence upward or downward depends on the details
of the model. For example, the very basic version of the Landes (1971) model with risk-neutral defendants
and positive costs of trial predicts that the prosecutor should reduce the maximum sentence oered.
14The legal literature has been concerned with the sentencing implications of parole releases (see
Genego, Goldberger, and Jackson [1975] for an early example). The empirical evidence on the relationship
between sentences imposed by judges and the anticipation that the oender will be released early is, to
our best knowledge, missing.
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actual sentences and defendants become suciently more likely to accept plea bargains.
The expected imposed sentence conditional on arrest SA should most likely decrease as
the probability of conviction decreases and the judges also reduce the sentences; however,
there is a theoretical possibility that it may rise if the prosecutors oer suciently harsher
sentences in plea bargaining.
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
We use the State Court Processing Statistics: Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties
(SCPS), an individual-level data set on approximately 100,000 criminal cases in state
courts.15 The sample covers 45 counties selected from 75 percent of the most populous
counties in the United States. It tracks cases that were led in May of every even year
from 1990 to 2002. The universe of the data set is cases initiated by a felony arrest.16
Due to missing values for relevant variables in some observations, the sample used in
regressions has over 83,000 observations.
The SCPS data set contains rich information on each case: oender characteristics
such as age, sex, and detailed prior record, information about the procedural aspects
of the case (pretrial detention, type of attorney), and the nal disposition of the cases
including the length of the maximum jail or prison sentence, if applicable. The oenses
are divided into 16 categories: violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, assault, and other
violent crimes) and non-violent crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, fraud,
other property crime, drug sales, other drug crimes, and four other minor categories). The
data are summarized in the rst column of Table 2.2.
The empirical strategy is based on a "quasi natural experiment", which compares the
treatment cases (those covered by the TIS laws) with appropriately chosen control cases.
We adopt two alternative "dierence-in-dierences-in-dierences" (D-i-D-i-D) estimators,
formally stated as
Yicst = f(TISicst, T ISstatest, Xicst, λct, λav, εicst), (2.3)
Yicst = f(TISicst, T ISstatest × violenticst, Xicst, λct, λav, εicst), (2.4)
15The data are collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. ICPSR study #2038.
16About 15 % of cases end up adjudicated as misdemeanors.
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where i, c, s, and t denote the individual case, oense type, state, and year, respec-
tively. Additionally, a denotes county and v denotes violent crime. Yicst stands for the
outcome variable, and TISicstis a dummy variable indicating whether the individual case
is covered by the TIS law.17 TISstatest is a dummy variable equal to one if a state has
the TIS law in force. TISstatest × violenticst is a dummy variable equal to one if a state
has adopted the TIS laws and a given oense is a violent felony. Xicst is a vector of
individual characteristics of the oender and the case.18 Finally, we include oense-year
xed eects λct and county-violent crime xed eects λav.19 The oense-year xed eects
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of each oense and year. Compared to
commonly used oense and year xed eects, they impose less restrictive assumptions
on the structure of the unobservables and allow, for example, separate national trends
in the outcomes of criminal cases for each oense. The county-violent crime xed eects
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the county level, further disaggregated for violent
and non-violent crimes. In alternative specications, we include state-oense xed eects
instead.20 εicst is an error term.
We use the D-i-D-i-D estimator, as opposed to the more conventional dierence-in-
dierences (D-i-D) estimator since the identifying assumption for the latter is unlikely
to hold. It would require that there is no dierential change between the adopting and
non-adopting states in the unobservables that aect outcomes in the oenses covered by
the TIS laws after the adopting states implemented them. However, the states adopting
the TIS laws may have adopted other "tough on crime" policies precisely because the
objective of the laws is to punish certain crimes more severely.If that is the case, the
error term may be correlated with the TISicst case dummy variable.
Our rst specication (equation 2.3) therefore includes a TIS state control (variable
17The TIS case dummy may change for a given case during the criminal process. For example, the
person may be arrested for a violent felony, and if convicted for a violent felony, the TIS law would
apply. However, he may be convicted for a misdemeanor, and the TIS law would no longer apply. In
the regressions, we set the TIS law according to the oense type that the oender is charged with at the
relevant stage of the criminal process.
18Prior felony convictions (measured by dummies for 1, 2, and 3 or more prior convictions), number
of prior misdemeanor convictions, log age, log age interacted with the prior conviction dummies, gender
dummy, race/origin dummies (white non-hispanic, black non-hispanic, hispanic, and other), and type of
attorney (public, private, assigned, pro se, and others) are included in the X vector.
19Represented by the interactions of county dummies with a dummy variable equal to one for violent
oense and zero for other oenses.
20Ideally, we would include the county-oense xed eects. However, there are too few observations for
many county-oense combinations which prevent a meaningful estimation. The county-violent crime xed
eects or state-oense xed eects are therefore workable compromises, still superior to a specication
with only county or state xed eects which assumes away any dierences in unobserved heterogeneity
between oense types within states.
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TISstatest). It captures the eect of state-specic unobservable variables that are po-
tentially correlated with the adoption of the TIS laws and aect all crimes equally. The
eect of the TIS laws is estimated from a within-state comparison of the change in the
outcome for the crimes covered by the TIS laws with the crimes that are not covered. It
is identied under the assumption that within a state the unobservable characteristics of
TIS oenses and other oenses follow the same trend, even though they may not follow
the same trend in the adopting and non-adopting states. In other words, the adopting
states may have gotten "tougher on crime" than the non-adopting states, but then did
so equally for all crimes.
The second specication (equation 2.4) exploits the fact that violent felonies are cov-
ered by the TIS laws in all states that adopted them while property, drug, and other
non-violent crimes are covered only in some states. It includes a TIS stateviolent crime
interaction (variable TISstatest× violenticst,) which captures the eect of unobservables
that are correlated with the adoption of the TIS laws and aect violent crimes only. The
eect of the TIS laws is estimated from a between-state comparison of the change in
the outcome for non-violent crimes in the states that imposed the TIS requirement on
both violent and non-violent crimes with the states that imposed the TIS laws on vio-
lent crimes only. The estimates are identied under the assumption the adopting states
may have gotten "tougher" on violent than on non-violent crimes but must have gotten
proportionately tougher on violent crimes irrespective of whether they imposed the TIS
laws on all crimes or just violent crimes.21
A possible change in the sample composition poses a concern. The TIS laws have been
accompanied by more intensive policing (Shepherd 2002). As the police arrests a larger
fraction of oenders, it is possible that it also arrests a dierent sample of oenders;
namely, the marginal oenders now being apprehended are likely to be those who are
more dicult to identify. The evidence against such oenders is likely to be weaker, and
they are less likely to be convicted. As a result, the average probability of conviction
may fall even in the absence of any behavioral response. The importance of this problem
can be checked by comparing the observable characteristics of cases before and after the
adoption of the TIS laws; presumably, should there be a change in the sample composition
of observables, it is quite likely that the unobservables changed as well. Table 2.2 show the
21Admittedly, the estimates are not identied if states imposed the TIS laws on certain crimes and
targeted other "tough on crime" policies on the same crimes. Unfortunately, there is no case-level
variation within a particular crime (which would be the case if the TIS laws applied only to oenders
with certain characteristics, for example).
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sample means for the observable characteristics of cases in the last year in the SCPS data
set before the TIS laws were adopted and in the rst year after the adoption.22 The table
does not show discernible changes in the observable characteristics. The only exception is
the share of defendants who use a public defender, which rose by 10 percentage points in
violent and by 11 percentage points in non-violent crime cases. This may indeed reect
a change in the strength of evidence, but the bias would rather go against the predicted
eects (public defenders tending to represent in less defensible cases). We further address
the sample composition issue in two robustness checks (section 2.4.7) with little eect on
the results.
2.4 Results
This section presents the results in two steps: First, we present the summary measures:
the reduction in overall probability of conviction conditional on arrest and the decrease
in the length of sentence imposed given the arrest. Then we investigate specic channels
behind the two summary ndings23 and the heterogeneity of behavioral responses across
dierent oense categories.
2.4.1 Probability of conviction conditional on arrest
Our rst summary measure of the eects of the TIS laws is the change in the proba-
bility that an arrested oender is eventually convicted, irrespective of whether via plea
bargaining or conviction at trial. The marginal eects from probit estimates are pre-
sented in Table 2.3. They imply a reduction in the probability of conviction by 9 percent.
22The data set records arrests made in May of an even year. For the two states that adopted the TIS
laws in the rst few months of an even year, we use the observations two years after the adoption to
allow the eect of TIS laws to be fully realized for the purpose of this before-after comparison.
23Two of the specic channels (the probability of conviction at trial and the length of sentence upon
conviction)) are estimated on sub-samples of cases at dierent stages of the criminal procedure. The
natural concern is that results for those channels are possibly aected by sample selection. The TIS
laws may have changed the distribution of unobservable characteristics in cases that result in conviction
or that proceed to trial. For example, if the TIS laws reduce the fraction of cases settled in plea
bargaining, the marginal oenders now proceeding to trial would face longer potential sentences than
the average oender previously proceeding to trial. Unfortunately, we do not have instruments that
would be correlated with the likelihood that the case proceeds to the subsequent stage and at the same
time would not be correlated with the error term in the outcome equation in that stage. We still think it
is preferable to present such results as tentative evidence and interpret them with caution. The majority
of the channels (the probability that the case is dismissed, the probability of pleading guilty, and the
probability that the prosector reduces charges) are estimated on the full sample and hence are not aected
by sample selection.
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This result is robust to alternative specicationscontrolling for the TIS state or the TIS
stateviolent crime interaction (columns 1 and 2) or for replacing the county-violent crime
xed eects with state-oense xed eects (columns 3 and 4).24 In all specications, the
marginal eects of the TIS case dummy are signicant at the 1 percent level.
We also report the marginal eects of the TIS state and the TIS stateviolent crime
controls to demonstrate the appropriateness of the D-i-D-i-D estimator.25 The coe-
cients of these two controls imply that the introduction of the TIS laws was associated
with an overall increase in the probability of conviction, including the cases that were
not subject to the TIS laws, on the order of 4 to 11 percent. Correspondingly, our es-
timates are dierent from the simple D-i-D estimates; when we exclude the TISstatest
or the TISstatest × violenticst controls such that the specication is reduced to D-i-D,
the marginal eect of the TISicst dummy becomes smaller in magnitude (-0.069). Even
though these regressions do not directly estimate the choices by judges and juries, they
nevertheless provide strong support for Andreoni's prediction in the sense that the crim-
inal justice system convicts less if the sentences to be actually served are raised.
2.4.2 Sentence imposed conditional on arrest
The second summary measure of the behavioral responses to the TIS laws is the change
in the sentence imposed conditional on arrest SA. It is obtained by estimating equations
2.3 and 2.4 on the full sample of arrests, the dependent variable being the logarithm
of the maximum prison or jail sentence imposed (in months). If the defendant was not
convicted, the sentence in the regressions is set to zero.26
We estimate Tobit and quantile regressions instead of the conventional OLS for several
reasons. The observed sentences are naturally censored at zero. They should also be
censored at a very high sentence length since the requirement to serve 85 percent out of a
70-year maximum sentence may be of little practical signicance. We therefore run Tobit
regressions with the lower bound set at zero and the upper bound at 55 years.27 Also,
24We also estimated alternative specications which included a dummy variable for the presence of
sentencing guidelines in a state and its interaction with the TIS case dummy; the key ndings of the
eects of the TIS laws were unaected.
25The marginal eects on the two controls are 0.041 and 0.07 in the specication with county-violent
crime xed eects, and 0.1 and 0.11 in the specication with the state-oense xed eects.
26The sentence is set to zero if the defendant was convicted but was punished with a ne instead of a
prison or jail sentence. To deal with the logarithm of zero, we add one month to each sentence.
27As an alternative, we estimated the Tobit model with the lower bound equal to 4.5 monthstreating
non-convictions and convictions with short sentences as equivalent outcomes, with little eect on the
results.
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we expect the impact of the TIS laws to be more pronounced the longer the potential
sentence is since the dierence between serving, say 5 weeks or 8.5 weeks out of a 10-week
maximum sentence may not be of such a concern to the judge than the dierence between
serving, say 5 years or 8.5 years out of a 10-year maximum sentence. The natural tool
to address this issue is a quantile regression estimated at several quantiles. It predicts a
change in a given quantile of the distribution of the dependant variable due to a change
in the independent variable.
Table 2.4 shows the Tobit estimates. In the specications with the oense-year and
county-violent crime xed eects, the marginal eect of the TIS case dummy is −0.114
when the TIS state control is included (column 1) and −0.097 when the TIS state-violent
crime control is included (column 2). Both are signicant at the1 percent level. In the
specications with oense-year and state-oense xed eects, the marginal eects are
smaller in magnitude (−0.083 and −0.039 for the respective controls, columns 3 and 4,
and signicant at the level of 1 and 10 percent).28
The estimates of the quantile regressions for the 75th and 90th quantiles are shown in
Table 2.5.29 They demonstrate that the behavioral response leading to shorter expected
sentences is concentrated on the longest sentences, conditional on other factors. The
marginal eects of the TIS case dummy are several times smaller in magnitude at the
75th quantile (columns 1 and 3) than at the 90th quantile although all of them are
statistically signicant at 1 percent level.
Both sets of regressions show fairly consistently that oenders covered by the TIS
laws experience a reduction in the sentence that they can expect at the time of arrest
compared to oenders not covered. The reduction was not trivial; we regard the average
of the four Tobit estimates (8.3 percent) as the most preferred "summary" result.
2.4.3 Probability of conviction disentangled
The TIS laws may have reduced the likelihood of eventual conviction through three
channels: a lower probability of conviction at trial, a higher probability that the case is
dismissed before reaching a verdict on merits, or a lower probability that the oender
28The marginal eects of the TIS state and TIS stateviolent crime interaction controls are positive
as expected and signicant at the 1 percent level. The unobserved factors that they capture increased
the expected sentence by between 10 to 23 percent, depending on the specication.
29The quantile regressions are estimated at the 75th and 90th percentiles only. They could not be
estimated at lower quantiles since zero sentence represents most observations for the 50th or lower
quantiles, leaving almost no variation in the dependant variable.
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accepts a plea bargain. The rst two columns of Table 2.6 estimate the eect of the
TIS laws on the probability of conviction at trial. They show a statistically signicant
reduction (by 9.8 percent) in the specication with the TIS state control and smaller and
insignicant (5.2 percent) reduction in the specication with the TIS state-violent crime
interaction.30
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6 estimate the magnitude of the second channel by probit
regressions with a dependant variable equal to one if the case was dismissed. The marginal
eects of the TIS case dummy are 0.051 and 0.035 in the two basic specications, and
both are signicant at the 1 percent level.31 The tendency to convict less apparently
applies to other stages of adjudication and not just to conviction/acquittal verdicts at
trial. Unfortunately, we cannot say to what extent the higher probability of a dismissal is
due to more dismissals by the judges during the pre-trial reviews and preliminary hearings
or by the prosecutors since both are theoretically plausible.
2.4.4 Plea bargaining
The next set of probit regressions estimates the eect of the TIS laws on the likelihood
that the case outcome is a guilty plea (columns 5 and 6). The estimates show a 9.5 percent
reduction in the specication with the TIS state control and an 11 percent reduction in
the specication with the TIS stateviolent crime interaction.
The reduction in guilty pleas did not come about mechanically due to the fact that
more cases were dismissed and therefore fewer cases were left to be potentially resolved
through plea bargaining. When the regressions are re-estimated on a subsample of cases
that were resolved either through plea bargaining or at trial, the marginal eects of the
TIS case dummy are statistically signicant at the 1 percent level although somewhat
smaller in magnitude (−4.1 and −7.2 percent in the two alternative specications).32
As the data do not record the exact terms that the defendants were oered in the
plea bargaining process, we can only partially infer whether the reduced probability of
30The results have to be interpreted with caution since the trial cases consist of a highly selected
sample. The selection, however, rather induces an upward bias. As the TIS laws induce fewer cases to
be resolved through plea bargaining, the marginal defendants who would have plead guilty now proceed
to trial. However, the evidence against such defendants would be stronger than the average defendants
who proceed to trial, implying an increase in the probability of conviction. The relatively small sample
size (4363 cases) inevitably limits the statistical signicance of the results.
31The coecients on the TIS state and TIS state-violent crime interaction controls are negative, again
indicating a presence of other "tough on crime" factors that tended to reduce dismissals.
32Detailed results are available upon request.
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accepting a plea bargain is due to the defendants being less willing to plead guilty holding
the terms of the plea bargain constant or due to the prosecutors oering relatively worse
terms. The SCPS data allow us to check two channels through which the prosecutors
can make the bargains less generous: by being less likely to reduce the charge from
felony to misdemeanor (while all defendants in the data set were initially arrested with
a felony charge) or by being less likely to reduce the charge to a felony which carries
a shorter sentence. Results from a probit dependant variable equal to one if the case
was adjudicated as a misdemeanor (columns 1 and 2) of Table 2.7 show a signicant
reduction in the likelihood that the charges would be reduced to a misdemeanor (by 4
or 2.7 percent, respectively, depending on the controls). The next two columns report
marginal eects from probit regressions where the dependant variable is equal to one
if the predicted sentence for the oense for which the case was adjudicated is shorter
than the predicted sentence for the oense for which the defendant was arrested.33 The
sample is restricted to cases that were adjudicated as felonies (to isolate the reductions to
a misdemeanor which we already estimated) and that resulted in conviction since only for
conviction cases is the adjudication oense recorded in the SCPS data set. The results
show a reduction in the likelihood of reducing charges by 2.3 percent when the TIS state
control is included and a smaller (and insignicant) reduction when the TIS stateviolent
crime control is included.
These ndings are qualitatively similar to Kessler and Piehl (1998) and tend to sup-
port the "maximizing" view of the prosecutors as opposed to the "justice-pursuing" view
of the prosecutors. The prosecutors appear to have "exploited" the increase in the sever-
ity of punishment by the TIS laws by oering the defendants harsher terms which they, in
turn, became less likely to accept. The contrast to Bjerk's (2005) nding that the prose-
cutors got "softer" in response to the three-strikes laws warrants further discussion. The
dierence in results can hardly be attributed to the dierences in empirical methodology
as Bjerk (2005) adopts a very similar D-i-D-i-D empirical strategy, uses the same data,
but estimates the prosecutors' response to a dierent punishment-enhancing policy. We
33The dependant variable was constructed as follows: First, we regressed the logarithm of the sentence
as a function of oense dummies, year dummies, and county-violent crime dummies in a sample of cases
that resulted in a conviction via plea bargaining. Second, we use the coecients from this regression to
predict, for each case in the sample, the sentence for which the defendant was arrested and the sentence
for which the case was adjudicated. Third, if the latter predicted sentence is shorter than the former,
the variable categorizing whether charges were reduced is equal to one. Across the sample, 11 percent
of defendants who are convicted of a felony are convicted of a felony with a shorter sentence than for
which they were arrested.
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instead hypothesize that the responses of prosecutors (and other enforcement agents in
general) to enhanced legislated sentences are inevitably context-specic. If prosecutors
regard more severe sentences as unjust, the tendency to "pursue justice" would domi-
nate, and their actions would mitigate the increased severity. On the other hand, if more
severe sentences conform to the prosecutors' norms of justice (in a given context), the
desire to mitigate is absent, and we observe responses consistent with narrow maximiza-
tion objectives. The prosecutors apparently shared the objectives of the TIS legislation
(Shepherd, 2002), which possibly explains why their observed responses are consistent
with the prosecutorial maximization in the context of the TIS laws but not in other
contexts.
2.4.5 Length of sentence imposed upon conviction
The last two columns of Table 2.6 show the eects of the TIS laws in the last stage
of the criminal procedure, i.e., the sentencing of the defendants who were convicted.34
Additional control variables are introduced: The plea dummy captures the dierence
between the sentence in plea and trial cases while its interaction with the TIS case dummy
allows us to see whether the TIS laws had a dierential impact on sentencing in plea cases
vis-à-vis the trial cases. The marginal eects of the TIS case dummy are positive and
signicant at the 1 percent level (0.223 and 0.260). The marginal eects of the plea-TIS
interactions are negative but small and insignicant, −0.053 and −0.058, implying that
the TIS laws did not have a discernibly dierential eect on the sentence length in cases
resolved through plea bargaining or trial. The positive coecient on the TIS case dummy
was obtained also when we experimented with alternative specications.35
These results do not support the prediction that the judges would mitigate a higher
fraction of the sentence served by imposing shorter sentences.36 One explanation is that
our TIS case dummy is still partially correlated with other "tough on crime" policies
even after controlling for the presence of the TIS law in the state, and the resulting
upward bias is greater than the behavioral response. The second explanation comes from
34The Tobit regressions are equivalent to those estimating the sentence conditional on arrest except
that we add a dummy variable for whether the defendant pleaded guilty and an interaction of the plea
dummy with the TIS case dummy.
35Such as including dummy variables for the presence of sentencing guidelines in the state, their
interaction with the TIS case dummy, or including state-oense xed eects instead of county-violent
crime xed eects.
36The only rather weak indicators of the osetting behavior are the oense-specic eects of the TIS
laws (Table 2.8). For violent crimes, there is indeed a large and negative eect on the sentence length.
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sample selection for which we were unable to correct. As the cases covered by the TIS
laws are more likely to be dismissed, the relatively weaker cases that would have received
relatively shorter sentences drop out of the sample. Also, defendants covered by the TIS
laws are more likely to reject the plea bargain and go to trial. All else equal (including a
sentence received if pleading guilty), the marginal defendant who was indierent between
a guilty plea and a trial expects to receive a longer sentence at trial than an inframarginal
defendant who strictly prefers going to trial. If the TIS laws shift the marginal defendant
to choose going to trial, the average sentence at trial would then rise, and the average
sentence in plea bargains would fall, as the results suggest.
2.4.6 Oense-specic eects
We also estimate the impacts of the TIS laws specic to individual crime categories:
murder, violent crime (other than murder), property, drug, and other crime.37 Table 2.8
reports the main results from regressions that are equivalent to those in Tables 2.3-2.7,
except that the single TIS dummy variable is replaced by interactions of the TIS dummy
with the dummies indicating the ve oense categories.38
The TIS laws aected the two main outcomes of interest, the probability of conviction
conditional on arrest and the sentence imposed conditional on arrest, predominantly
among non-violent crimes. The probability of conviction declined by 13.6, 6.9, and 14.5
percent for property, drug, and other crimes, respectively; the sentence conditional on
arrest declined by 15.3, 9.9, and 14.3 percent. The estimated eects are signicant at
the 1 percent level. For violent crimes (other than murder), the results indicate a smaller
(5 percent) reduction in the probability of conviction but no signicant eect on the
sentence imposed conditional on arrest. Almost no estimates are signicant for murder.
Similar patterns apply to the particular channels behind the summary measures. The
estimated eects of the TIS laws on the increase in the probability that a case is dismissed,
the reduction in the probability that the defendant accepts the plea bargain, and the
reduction in the probability that charges are reduced to misdemeanor are all larger in
magnitude and have smaller standard errors for non-violent crimes than for the violent
37The "violent crime" (other than murder) category includes rape, robbery, assault, and other violent
crime; the "property crime" category includes burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, forgery, fraud,
and other property crime; the "drug crime" category includes drug sales and other drug oenses; the
"other crime" category includes weapons-related oenses, driving-related oenses, and other oenses.
38It is impossible to estimate the specication with the TISstatest × violenticst interaction variable
because all states that adopted the TIS laws covered all violent crimes. The eects on violent crimes
overall and sub-categories of violent crimes cannot be separated.
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crimes. On the contrary, the estimates for the sentence imposed upon conviction show
large reductions in the sentence for violent crimes but are not signicant and have dierent
signs for other crimes.
2.4.7 Robustness checks
Our main results are generally robust to alternative specications. The rst set of ro-
bustness checks addresses the concern that the TIS laws altered the distribution of the
unobserved characteristics of arrests. If the police make more arrests and the marginal
arrests tend to be cases with weaker evidence than the average cases, the probability of
conviction would fall. This mechanism may explain the observed increase in the proba-
bility that the case is dismissed as the judges and prosecutors "weed out" some of the
marginal arrests with particularly weak evidence. If, however, the judges and prosecutors
apply the same standard for dismissing the case, the distribution of the strength of evi-
dence in the sub-sample of cases that proceed beyond dismissal should remain constant.
Our rst robustness check exploits this plausible assumption by re-estimating the model
on a subsample of cases that were not dismissed.39 The estimated marginal eects of
the TIS cases dummy on the probability of conviction are -0.05 and -0.059, depending
on the specication (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.9). They are somewhat smaller than
the estimates obtained from the full sample40 but remain highly statistically signicant.
Interestingly, the eect of the TIS state and TIS stateviolent controls vanish. Likewise
for the sentence conditional on arrest, the marginal eects of the TIS case dummy are
somewhat smaller than the full sample estimates (-0.095 and -0.082), but they are not
dierent in the statistical sense.
The second robustness check exploits information about the pretrial phase of the case.
The defendant is more likely to be released on bail, and the terms of the pre-trial release
tend to be more favorable if the evidence is weak or the case is less serious. Should the
judges apply the same standards in the pre-trial release decisions under the TIS laws
as they did before, the information about pre-trial release is a relevant control for the
strength and seriousness of the cases. The SCPS data contain information about the type
of pre-trial release granted,41 the amount of bail set, and the behavior of the defendant
39As a result, the sample is reduced to approximately 62,000 observations.
40The condence intervals of the marginal eects obtained from the full sample do not overlap with
the condence intervals of the marginal eects obtained from the sample excluding the dismissed cases.
41The types of pretrial release are categorized as follows: nancial release, nonnancial release, emer-
gency release, held on bail, denied bail, release conditions unknown, detained but reasons unknown.
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during the pre-trial phase.42 In columns 5-8, we re-estimate the model with dummy
variables for each release type, the amount of bail set, and a dummy variable equal to
one if the defendant failed to appear.43 Including these controls has essentially no eect
on the estimates in the probability of conviction regressions. In the sentence conditional
on arrest regressions, the marginal eect of the TIS case dummy is the same (0.114) when
the TIS state control is included and slightly smaller (0.077) when the TIS state x violent
crime interaction is included.
The third robustness check addresses the concern that the TIS state and the TIS
stateviolent crime control may not adequately capture the unobservables aecting the
outcomes of violent crimes. We therefore estimate the model on a sub-sample of non-
violent crimes only, reducing the estimator to a simple D-i-D. It comes at a cost of
dropping the crimes for which the TIS laws were designed but at a benet of keeping
the crimes for which any confounding eects are likely to be less serious. The estimated
eects (-0.098 for the probability of conviction and -0.129 for the sentence conditional on
arrest) are similar to those obtained in the full sample and to the oense-specic eects
reported for non-violent crimes in Table 2.8.
The last set of checks exploits the variation in the intensity of the TIS laws. There
are two sources of such variation. First, while most states followed the federal law and
required oenders to serve 85 percent of the sentence, 3 states in our sample opted for
100 percent44 and 2 states for 50 percent only.45 Second, the fraction of the time actually
served had varied among states and oenses prior to the adoption of the TIS laws. We
expect the TIS laws to "bite" more if the oenders had previously served a shorter fraction
of the sentence. We ran the same set of regressions, where we replaced the TIS dummy
variable (and all interactions) with a continuous variable equal to the predicted fraction
of the sentence served.
The predicted fraction is constructed as follows: For cases not covered by the TIS
laws, it is computed from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) data
series, individual-level data on approximately 2.9 million prisoners released from prison
between 1989 and 2002.46 The data were collected at the time of release and contain
information on the individual characteristics of prisoners, the oense for which they were
42Whether he failed to appear, became a fugitive, or was re-arrested.
43The failure to appear is likely a good indicator of strength of the evidence and eventual conviction.
44Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
45Indiana, Maryland.
46The data is available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/SERIES/00038.xml.
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sentenced, the maximum and minimum sentence to which they were sentenced and the
time served under the current admission. The predicted fraction of the sentence served
is calculated by dividing the time served by the maximum sentence for each oender and
then taking the average for each state-year-oense combination. The information about
the time of admission to prison allows us to distinguish which prisoners were sentenced
under the TIS laws and which were not. The number of observations for some states47 is
too small to predict the fraction for each state-year-oense. These states were dropped,
reducing the number of observations used in the regressions by 7 percent. For cases
covered by the TIS laws, we set the predicted fraction to the minimum fraction required
by the TIS legislation in the respective state for the respective oense.48
The results are presented in Table 2.10.49 They are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar for the following outcomes of interest: probability of conviction conditional on
arrest, probability of conviction at trial, and the probability of reducing charges to a mis-
demeanor. For example, the marginal eect of the predicted fraction on the probability
of conviction conditional on arrest is −0.074, which implies approximately a 2.5 percent
reduction in that probability.50 The marginal eect on the probability of conviction at
trial implies a 12 percent reduction in that probability.
Qualitatively the same but quantitatively dierent estimates are found for the proba-
bility of a guilty pleathe eect is also negative but very small and statistically insigni-
cant. For three outcomes the specication with the expected fraction implies qualitatively
dierent results than the TIS dummy: The eects on the sentence conditional on arrest
and the probability that the case would be dismissed are statistically insignicant and
have the opposite sign. The eect on the sentence imposed upon conviction is negative,
47Arizona, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
48Ideally, we would like to use the predicted fraction served for cases covered by the TIS laws as well.
However, we have two reasons why we prefer the legislated rather than predicted fraction. First, the
predicted fraction is likely to be downward-biased for the cases covered by the TIS laws. New admissions
to prison covered by the TIS laws occur only after the TIS laws are in force (1994 or later in most states).
The NCRP data set therefore cannot record releases of prisoners who served 8 or more years post-TIS
(and actually more than mere 2 years for those admitted to prison in 2000). Missing observations for
releases after 2002 induces a downward bias in the estimate of the fraction since we are more likely to
observe prisoners who were released early. Due to this limitation we are also unable to observe post-TIS
fraction of the sentence served for very long maximum sentences. Second, it may be more plausible to
assume that agents in the criminal process acted upon the expectation that the post-TIS oenders would
serve the legislated minimum fraction rather than the ex-post realizations of the fraction.
49Due to space limitations, only the coecients on the expected fraction served and their standard
errors are reported. Full results are available upon request.
50The TIS laws raised the expected fraction of the sentence served from approximately 50% to 85%,
i.e., by approximately 0.35. The coecients on the fraction served should therefore be divided by 1/0.35
(approximately 3) to obtain estimates comparable to those on the TIS dummy variable.
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statistically signicant, and large in magnitude. The last result is at least consistent with
the theoretical prediction that judges should respond to the TIS laws by imposing shorter
sentences, which was not conrmed in the main regressions (Table 2.6).
2.5 Conclusion
Our evaluation of the impacts of the Truth-in-Sentencing laws produced consistent ev-
idence on several channels of behavioral responses to more severe punishment in the
criminal justice process. Requiring oenders to serve a higher fraction of their sentence
in prison signicantly reduced the probability that an arrested oender is convicted. This
result represents one of the rst empirical tests of the popular Andreoni (1991) model.
Moreover, the magnitude of the reduction (9 percent) is empirically relevant and sug-
gests that this line of behavioral response should be seriously considered in the design of
sentencing policies.
The overall eect of the TIS laws was a reduction in the imposed sentence expected
upon arrest. The stated intention of the TIS laws to increase criminal punishment was
therefore mitigated by the behavioral responses on several margins. The magnitude of the
mitigating eect is empirically relevant as well. In the absence of the behavioral responses,
the increase in the fraction of the sentence served to 85 percent would have increased the
expected sentence actually served by 70 percent on average. The behavioral responses
reduced the expected imposed sentence conditional on arrest by 8 percent, which implies
that the expected sentence actually served rose by "only" 56 percent.51 The behavioral
responses have therefore undone about one-fth of the intended direct eect of the TIS
laws. Also, they inevitably increased the disparities in punishment. Because of the TIS
laws, a higher fraction of defendants walk away with no punishment at all while a smaller
fraction of those who are convicted are punished much more severely.
Last, the results give an interesting perspective on the behavioral responses of the
judges and prosecutors. The behavioral responses were most pronounced for non-violent
crimes but small or insignicant for violent crimes. The primary goal of the TIS laws was
to punish violent oenders more heavily. If the judges and prosecutors share that goal,
51The expected sentence actually served was pSC · 0.5 = SA · 0.5 in the absence of the TIS laws (0.5
being the average fraction of the sentence served). In the absence of behavioral responses, it would rise
to SA · 0.85, a 70-percent increase. The behavioral responses reduced SA by 8 percent. Hence the new
sentence actually served, conditional on arrest, increased to SA · 0.92 · 0.85, which is 56 percent higher
than the pre-TIS law level.
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they may not apply any osetting behavior in violent crime cases, but they may have as
well regarded the TIS laws as unnecessarily overreaching when they were applied to non-
violent crimes. Tthe osetting behavior is then a logical reaction. A similar conclusion
can be drawn when comparing our nding that the prosecutor got "tougher" in plea
bargaining in response to the TIS laws with Bjerk's (2005) nding that the prosecutors
instead got "softer" in response to the three-strikes laws. Judges and prosecutors do
respond to more severe sentences, but they do so selectively. Alternative models of
judicial and prosecutorial behavior need not be, after all, mutually exclusive but may
correctly characterize the behavior of even the same individual judges and prosecutors
depending on the context of the particular legislation.
55
2.6 References
Andreoni, J. (1991). Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should
the Penalty Fit the Crime? The RAND Journal of Economics 22(3), 385-395.
Bjerk, D. (2005). Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing. Journal of Law and Economics 48,
591-625.
Ditton P.M. and D.J.Wilson (1999). Truth in Sentencing in State Prisons. Bureau of
Justice Statistics Special Report.
Genego, W.J., P.D. Goldberger, and V.C. Jackson (1975). Parole Release Decision-
making and the Sentencing Process. Yale Law Journal 84(4), 810-902.
Kessler, D.P. and A.M. Piehl (1998). The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice
System. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 14(2), 256-276.
Kuziemko, I. (2006). Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Aect Plea Bargaining in
Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment.
American Law and Economics Review 8(1),116-142.
Landes, William M. (1971). The Economics Analysis of Courts. Journal of Law and
Economics 14(1), 61-107.
Miceli, T.J. (1996). Plea Bargaining and Deterrence: An Institutional Approach.
European Journal of Law and Economics 3(3), 249-264.
Owens, Emily G. (2010). Truthiness in Punishment: The Far Reach of Truth-in-
Sentencing Laws in State Courts. unpublished manuscript.
Reinganum, J.F. (1988). Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion. The American
Economic Review 78(4), 713-728.
Reinganum, J.F. (2000). Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bar-
gaining. The RAND Journal of Economics 31(1), 62-81.
Shepherd, J.M. (2002). Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing:
The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws. Journal of Law and Economics 45, 509-534.
Snyder, E.A. (1990). The Eect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antitrust Enforce-
ment. Journal of Law and Economics 33(2), 439-462.
U.S. Department of Justice, Oce of the Attorney General (1993). Combating Violent
Crime: Twenty-Four Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice.
U.S. Department of Justice, Oce of Justice Programs (2005). Violent Oender Incar-
ceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Formula Grant Program. Report to Congress.
56
Walsh, J.E. (2004). Tough for Whom? How Prosecutors and Judges Use Their
Discretion to Promote Justice under the California Three-Strikes Law. Crime and Justice
Policy Program of the Henry Salvatori Center for the Study of Individual Freedom in the
Modern World, Henry Salvatori Center Monograph New Series No. 4.
57
Table 2.1: Adoption of the TIS laws
State Year of introduction Requirement(%) Type of crime covered
Alabama NA
Arizona 1994 85 all
California 1994 85 violent felony
Connecticut 1996 85 violent felony
District of Columbia 1989 85 violent felony
Florida 1995 85 all
Georgia 1995 85 violent felony
Hawaii NA
Illinois 1995 85 all
Indiana NA
Kentucky 1998 85 violent felony
Massachusetts NA
Maryland NA
Michigan 1994 85 part I violent
Missouri 1994 85 repeat or dangerous felony
New Jersey 1997 85 violent felony
New York 1995 85 violent felony
Ohio 1996 85 felony
Pennsylvania 1911 100 part I violent
Tennessee 1995 85 violent felony
Texas 1993 50 aggravated
Utah 1985 85 all
Virginia 1995 100 felony
Washington 1990 85 part I violent
Wisconsin 1999 100 felony
Sources:
United States General Accounting Oce: Truth In Sentencing: Availability of Federal Funds
Inuenced Laws in Some States, Report to Congressional Requesters, February 1998.
Chen, Elsa: Impact of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing on the Volume and Composition
of Correctional Populations, Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, March 2000.
Table includes only the states covered in the SCPS data set.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Mean violent crime non-violent crime
last year rst year last year rst year
Case Outcomes all before TIS after TIS before TIS after TIS
adoption adoption adoption adoption
% convicted cases/arrest 67.31 64.24 60.06 75.59 72.33
(46.90) (47.94) (48.99) (42.96) (44.74)
sentence/arrest in months 15.06 29.17 24.23 15.19 11.66
(69.19) (117.58) (114.15) (71.44) (54.96)
% convicted cases/trial 80.23 77.01 75.25 76.30 78.59
(39.83) (42.19) (43.26) (42.62) (41.08)
% dismissed or acquitted 25.71 32.01 36.62 18.03 22.30
(43.70) (46.66) (48.19) (38.44) (41.63)
% pleaded guilty 63.01 58.24 53.80 73.48 68.96
(48.28) (49.33) (49.87) (44.15) (46.27)
plea sentence/plea conviction 18.32 31.73 27.98 18.17 14.66
in months (59.79) (83.27) (88.01) (72.29) (59.31)
trial sentence/trial conviction 82.32 178.36 149.08 87.40 46.29
in months (229.83) (369.52) (354.35) (228.13) (123.49)
Individual Characteristics
age 29.99 28.32 29.68 29.56 30.137
(10.30) (10.31) (11.25) (9.54) (10.05)
% black 36.30 41.97 37.55 34.07 34.11
(48.09) (49.36) (48.43) (47.40) (47.41)
% hispanic 21.07 21.40 22.26 21.81 21.65
(40.78) (41.02) (41.61) (41.30) (41.19)
% women 16.72 10.99 13.10 16.41 18.07
(37.31) (31.28) (33.75) (37.04) (38.49)
prior felony convictions 1.07 0.86 0.84 1.05 1.03
(1.91) (1.63) (1.60) (1.85) (1.76)
prior misdemeanor convictions 1.61 1.45 1.50 1.75 1.67
(2.58) (2.53) (2.51) (2.76) (2.67)
public defender (%) 40.35 40.17 53.04 42.37 54.83
(49.06) (49.04) (49.92) (49.42) (49.77)
private attorney (%) 13.12 14.74 12.26 14.11 13.17
(33.77) (35.46) (32.81) (34.82) (33.81)
assigned attorney (%) 11.09 11.87 13.94 12.22 10.80
(31.40) (32.34) (34.65) (32.75) (31.04)
# Observations/arrest 83506 2402 2381 7628 7937
# Observations/ trial 4482 187 198 211 341
# Observations/trial conviction 3567 144 146 161 267
# Observations/ plea conviction 52387 1395 1281 5578 5470
Standard errors in parentheses.
Only states that eventually adopted the TIS laws are included in the summary statistics
for a comparison between before and after TIS. To calculate the overall means of the variables,
additional states that did not introduce TIS (Alabama, Indiana, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Maryland, and Texas) are also included.
Table 2.3: Probit Estimates, Probability of Conviction Conditional on Arrest
1 2 3 4
TIS case -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.093*** -0.061***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
TISstate 0.042*** 0.105***
(0.011) (0.010)
TISstate x violent 0.070*** 0.108***
(0.017) (0.015)
oense x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
county x violent Yes Yes No No
dummies
state x oense No No Yes Yes
dummies
# observations 83,506 83,506 83,437 83,437
pseudo R2 0.153 0.153 0.140 0.139
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Marginal eects on the probability and their standard errors (in parentheses)
are reported.
All regressions include the individual characteristics of the oender and
the case (age, sex, race, prior convictions, and type of attorneys).
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Table 2.4: Tobit Estimates, Imposed Sentence Conditional on Arrest (all cases)
1 2 3 4
TIS case -0.114*** -0.097*** -0.083*** -0.040
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
TISstate 0.106*** 0.185***
(0.028) (0.032)
TISstate x violent 0.172*** 0.233***
(0.058) (0.061)
oense x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
county x violent Yes Yes No No
dummies
state x oense No No Yes Yes
dummies
# observations 83,244 83,244 83,244 83,244
pseudo R2 0.095 0.095 0.093 0.093
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Marginal eects on the sentence and their standard errors (in parentheses)
are reported.
All regressions include the individual characteristics of the oender and
the case (age, sex, race, prior convictions, and types of attorneys).
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Table 2.5: Quantile Estimates, Imposed Sentence Conditional on Arrest
1 2 3 4
TIS case -0.111*** -0.0161*** -0.394*** -0.183***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.046)
TISstate 0.421*** 0.513***
(0.000) (0.048)
TISstate x violent 0.258*** 0.215**
(0.000) (0.097)
oense x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
county x violent Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
quantile 75% 75% 90% 90%
# observations 83,244 83,244 83,244 83,244
pseudo R2 0.236 0.236 0.194 0.193
Standard errors in parentheses
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
The reported coecients denote the marginal eects on the probability.
All regressions include the individual characteristics of the oender and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Probit Estimates, Probability of Reducing Charges
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Misdemeanor Felony with shorter sentence
TIS case -0.040*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
TIS state 0.030*** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.009)
TISstate x violent 0.011 -0.011
(0.013) (0.015)
oense x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
county x violent Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
# observations 83,245 83,245 36,851 36,851
pseudo R2 0.194 0.194 0.118 0.118
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Marginal eects on the probability and standard errors (in parentheses)
are reported.
All regressions include the individual characteristics of the oender and
the case (age, sex, race, prior convictions, and type of attorneys).
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Table 2.8: Oense-Specic Eects
Dependent Variable Sample Oense Categories
murder other property drug other
violent
Probability of all 0.066 -0.050** -0.136*** -0.070*** -0.145***
conviction (0.057) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020)
Expected imposed all 0.138 -0.027 -0.153*** -0.100*** -0.144***
sentence (0.177) (0.054) (0.030) (0.029) (0.041)
Maximum sentence convicted 0.449* -0.580** 0.041 -0.087 0.289*
imposed (0.241) (0.262) (0.129) (0.155) (0.164)
Probability of trial 0.114*** -0.114 -0.190** -0.049 -0.031
conviction (0.042) (0.074) (0.080) (0.065) (0.082)
Probability of all -0.009 -0.023 -0.139*** -0.071*** -0.157***
a guilty plea (0.067) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020)
Probability of all -0.045 0.036* 0.065*** 0.047*** 0.060***
dismissed (0.051) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Probability of all -0.012 -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.047*** -0.028***
reducing charges (0.070) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Marginal eects and their standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.
All regressions include the individual characteristics of the oender and the case
(age, sex, race, prior convictions, and type of attorneys), oense-year dummies,
county dummies interacted with violent crime dummies, and the interaction term of the TIS


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Estimates of the TIS Eect Using the Predicted Fraction of the Sentence
Served
Dependent Variable Sample Regression Specication
TISstate TISstate x violent
Probability of conviction all cases probit -0.075*** -0.078***
(0.021) (0.021)
Expected imposed sentence all cases tobit 0.098 0.110*
(0.060) (0.060)
Expected imposed sentence convicted cases tobit -0.297* -0.298*
(0.161) (0.158)
Probability of conviction trial cases probit -0.360*** -0.285***
(0.090) (0.083)
Probability of a guilty plea all cases probit -0.003 -0.033
(0.022) (0.022)
Probability of dismissal all cases probit -0.027 -0.036*
(0.019) (0.0190)
Probability of reducing charges all cases probit -0.059*** -0.049***
to misdemeanor (0.015) (0.015)
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
The table reports the marginal eect and standard errors (in parenthese) on the fraction
of the predicted sentence served in regressions that are equivalent to regressions in Tables
2.3 through 2.7 except that the TIS case dummy is replaced with the fraction of the
expected sentence served.
Specication "TISstate" denotes regressions controlling for the presence of the TIS law
in the state (equation 2.3). Specication "TIS state x violent" denotes regressions con-
trolling for an interaction of the TIS state dummy and a violent crime dummy (equation
2.4).
All regressions include the individual characteristics of the oender and the case (age,
sex, race, prior convictions, and type of attorneys), oense-year dummies, and county




Air Pollutants in the Czech Republic -
Decomposition Analysis
Fusako Tsuchimoto and Milan Scasny
Abstract
We statistically decompose the change in the emission level of the various pollutants
such as SOx, CO, NOx, VOC, and particulate matters (PM) in the Czech Republic.
First, we decompose the emission level in 1995 - 2007 into three factors: emission
intensity eect, scale eect, and composition eect. We nd that the implementation
of command and control types of law, which required the large sources of emissions
to satisfy emission limits until 1999, were highly eective in the reduction of the
emission level of SOx, NOx, CO, and PM. Moreover, the reduction was mainly
induced by a change in the emission intensity eect, which captures the change in
environmental eciency relative to the per capita GDP.
Secondly, we further decompose the emission intensity eect into three factors (1)a
fuel intensity eect (2)a fuel mix eect, and (3)an emission coecient eect. We
nd that the emission coecient eect is the most prominent factor, especially
during the period of 1995-1999. In other words, command and control regulation
motivates rms to decrease their emission levels by improving abatement technology,
represented by the end-of-pipe technology, not by changing fuel usage.
Keywords: Air Pollution, Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis,
Decomposition Analysis
JEL Codes: Q53, Q58, O13
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3.1 Introduction
Many argue that rapid economic growth is accompanied by a change in environmental
quality. One of the most prominent hypothesis, Environmental Kuznets Curve hypoth-
esis, (EKC hypothesis) claims that per capita GDP and environmental quality have a
negative relationship in the early stage of the development of a country. In the later
stage, after a certain threshold, the economic growth, in contrast, has a positive eect
on the environmental quality. Grossman and Krueger (1995), in their pioneering study,
which supports EKC hypothesis, show that there is an inverse-U or N relationship be-
tween some of the environmental degradation level indicators and per capita income.
However, it is usually hard to base some policy recommendations on any reduced form
analysis of environmental degradation and per capita income: We cannot tell through
which channel the level of GDP per capita aects environmental quality nor can we esti-
mate the extent each factor's contribution. Compared to the reduced-form analysis in the
Environmental Kuznets Curve literature, where the only overall eect of the GDP level
on pollution is measured, a decomposition analysis can identify through which channel
the economy aects environmental quality and thus would help to induce clearer policy
recommendations, as noted in Tsurumi and Managi (2010).
In this paper, we conduct a statistical decomposition analysis to examine the driving
force of change in the air pollutants and the degree of their contribution to environmental
degradation. Specically, we analyze the emission level of various pollutants such as
sulphur dioxide (SOx), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxide (NOx), volatile organic
compounds (VOC), and particulate matters (PM) in the Czech Republic. First, the
emission level of pollutants in 1997-2007 in the Czech Republic is decomposed into 3
factors: an emission intensity eect, a scale eect, and a composition eect. Emission
intensity eect measures how the rms are environmentally ecient relative to their
economic output. Scale eect measures how economic growth as a whole aects air
pollutant emissions. Finally the composition eect captures how the change in economic
structure aects pollution levels, e.g. a decrease in the output of a pollution-intensive
sector leads to cleaner production, and thus the overall emission level would go down.
Further, our unique data set may enable us to conduct a more rened analysis than
existing studies, which is the main contribution of this paper to the existing literature:
We decompose intensity eect into three factors (1)a fuel intensity eect (2)a fuel mix
eect, and (3)an emission coecient eect. The fuel intensity eect measures a change in
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the consumption composition of consumption of each type of fuel used in the production
per unit of economic output. The fuel mix eect measures how the composition of various
types of fuels used aects emission levels. Finally, the emission coecient eect measures
how eectively fuels are used in terms of air pollutants, i.e., it captures the change in
end-of-pipe type technology.1 In the existing literature, the emission coecient is usually
time invariant, which is a theoretically determined value from chemistry. In our data, the
exact amount of pollutants released by a particular type of fuel is reported, e.g. how much
SO2 is released per tonne of hard coal at each facility level. That means that compared
to the conventional time invariant or sectoral level emission coecient, we have richer
variation at facility level as well as in time dimension. Only few studies, such as Viguier
(1999) or Ang and Pandyan (1997) use a time variant emission coecient. However,
they use the sectoral level emission coecient, which means that their method would
give a biased result unless those rms in the sample exactly represent the entire sector
in terms of emission level, which is quite a strong assumption. Further, in our data set,
both emission amounts and fuel consumption are directly measured, which leads to richer
variation compared to knowing the value of one variable only and then calculating the
other using the theoretical value.
In this paper, specically the following questions are answered: (1) What is the con-
tributing factor to the relationship between per capita income and environmental degra-
dation in the Czech Republic during the period between 1995-2007? (2) What is the
extent and trend of the contribution of each factor?
First, the nding of this paper is the law in the Czech Republic, which was imple-
mented in 1991 with further specications introduced in 1997 and which required large
sources to satisfy a certain emission limit by 1999, was quite eective in reducing the
emission levels of SOx, NOx, CO and PM: it contributed to a signicant decrease in the
emission of these pollutants in the period 1995-1999. Secondly, we nd that the leading
factor of this decrease was the intensity eect, which is consistent with the ndings of
other studies from developed or transition countries.
Separating the contribution of the emission coecient from the fuel mix allows us to
observe the behavioral response of the rms to environmental policy targets. When the
emission coecient is the prominent contributor to the change in emissions, it suggests
1Here 'end-of-pipe type technology' refers to all the abatement technology which reduces emission
amounts given the same amount of fuel consumed. Representative of such technology would be an
installed lter or improvement in environmental eciency of the combustion process.
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rms adjust their environmental behavior by improving their environmental technology.
On the other hand, if the fuel mix eect is the main contributor, it shows that the rm
becomes environmentally ecient by changing the composition of the fuels they use in
their production process. At last, the large intensity eect suggests that rms decrease
the use of their fuels per unit of economic output to reduce the overall emission level.
In fact, the second nding of this paper is that the reduction of the air pollutants in
the Czech Republic between 1997-1999 was mainly due to the emission coecient eect.
This nding shows that command and control regulation did not motivate rms to simply
decrease their usage of the fuel amount or change the composition of the fuels used but
motivated rms to decrease their emission levels by improving on their end-of-pipe type
technology, even though the rms used the same amount of fuel.
Thirdly, we nd that after 2000, after satisfying EU regulation requirements, rms did
not have the motivation to decrease their emission levels further, so the emission level of
pollutants stays more or less stable. Further, the structure of the economy in the Czech
Republic actually contributes to an increase in the emission level.
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next part, the institutional back-
ground of air emission and regulation in the Czech Republic and the related literature are
presented in accordance with our analysis. In the second and third section, the methodol-
ogy and information on data are presented. The result of the analysis is presented in the
fourth section, and the conclusions and remarks on a future perspective of the research
follow.
3.1.1 Institutional Background
A decomposition analysis has been employed by many studies to investigate the factors
which contribute to the emissions of air pollutants. Most of the studies target Western
European countries (Torvanger 1991, Lofgren and Muller 2010, and many others), and
there are only very few studies that examine cases in transition countries. In this sense,
our study lls this gap as it examines the factors that contribute to changes in emissions
in the Czech Republic, a CEE country, during 1995-2007, which includes its transition
and post-transition period.
Our analysis focuses on the period of economic and political transformation in the
Czech Republic that started after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. During the communistic
regime, the centrally planned system was characterized by the high energy, resource, and
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pollution intensities due to a lack of environmental regulation. By looking at the high
emission level of pollutants, one can see that there was an excessive amount at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. However, this high level of environmental degradation did not persist:
the Czech government introduced several policies to decrease the emission level of pollu-
tion in order to comply with the Community Acquis of the EU. As a result, the emission
amount of airborne pollutants signicantly decreased in the Czech Republic by 1999.
Specically, the new Air Quality Law No.309/1991, which required each existing large
stationary emission source (power plants, and industrial processes) to comply to strict
emission levels until 1998, and this contributed to the large reduction of air pollutants.2
These emission limits determined in 1991 were amended in 1992 and 1995. Further
amendments were made by new decrees in 1997 and 2002. To sum up, command and
control regulation was eective in the Czech Republic in reducing the large amount of
emissions of air pollutants, especially SO2, NOx, and PM. In contract, using a market-
based instrument, such as emission permits trading after 1990, was neither eective nor
ecient in regulating air quality in the Czech Republic.3
3.1.2 Literature Review
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis states that there is an inverted-U curve
relationship between per capita income and the emission level of various pollutants. Start-
ing with the pioneering work done by Grossman and Krueger (1995), there are numerous
studies discussing validity of this hypothesis: Some empirically show or disverify the
hypothsis.
For example, Stern, Common and Barbier (1996) critically review the literature on
EKC hypothesis in terms of the data and econometric method used in the studies. Further
they conduct a simulation using the estimated parameter from the literature and conclude
that SOx (SO2) should continue to rise with the development level of a country rather
than decline as the EKC hypothesis suggests.
Agras and Chapman (1999) estimate a dynamic EKC relationship between income and
CO2 or per capita consumption of energy, including energy prices, based on the stylized
2No. 309/1991 applies at the federal level (Czechoslovakia). On the other hand, No.389/1991 applies
to the national level (the Czech Republic). Furthermore, No.309 is more substantial and determines the
emission limits and deadlines to fulll the requirement; On the other hand, No.389 is administrative and
gives the competence to CIZP (eská inspekce ºivotního prost°edí - Czech environment inspectorate).
3For a detailed discussion regarding the market-based instrument in the Czech Republic, see Maca,
Melichar and Scasny (2010).
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fact that the total global emission of CO2 increases or decreases with a change in oil
price. Specically, as in Suri and Chapman (1998), they include the ratio of imports and
exports of all manufactured goods over domestic production to capture the openness of
the economy. They nd that there would be no evidence for an EKC relationship between
income and energy consumption if energy prices and trade variables are controlled for
in the estimation. In this regard, actually their result leads to the criticism of EKC:
(1)The countries' emission moves from SOx or other pollutants towards CO2 emission as
countries become more opened. (2) However, the mobility of the pollutants depends on
their prices rather than onthe development level of the country.
Most studies estimate a reduced form equation because of data availability or the
diculty in nding an appropriate identication strategy. Because of the nature of re-
duced form analysis, the reason why per capita income and emission levels have (or do
not have) such a relationship is unclear in these studies. Further, Stern (2002) nds
that the results from the decomposition model have better statistical properties than the
standard EKC specication and discusses that the basic EKC model is a nested version of
a decomposition model, and the EKC model is the one with restrictions. In other words,
his paper motivates the use of statistical decomposition in examining the emissions of air
pollutants or energy use.
In fact, recently, a relative large number of studies employ a decomposition analysis
to investigate the contributing factor of changes in airborne pollutants or energy use.
These studies dier in various ways: the number of factors of the decompsition, the
decomposition method employed, and the regions covered by the analysis.
First, there are dierences in the decomposition method itself. The two main streams
are the Laspeyres and Divisia index methods. The Laspeyres index has an advantage in
that it is quite intuitive and easier to understand. However, when the absolute contribu-
tion of each factor is relatively large, it may generate large unexplained residuals. In this
regard, the extension of classic Laspeyres methods, the Sun-Shapley method, can over-
come this shortage and manage to achieve perfect decomposition (no residuals); however,
their method allocates the residuals arbitrarily. Thus, some studies employ the Divisia
index-based method in their analysis, which overcomes this problem (e.g. Viguier 1999;
Ang 2004). In this regard, Viguier analyzes specically SO2, NOx, and CO2 emissions
in three CEE and former CIS countries (Hungary, Poland, and Russia) and three OECD
countries, (the US, the UK and France) for the period between 1971-1994. First, he
uses the energy-balance method to evaluate the emissions by sector and concludes that
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transition economies generally have a higher intensity of emission. Then, he proceeds to
decompose energy intensities into 4 factors, namely (1) the emission factors, (2) the fuel
mix, (3) the sectoral structure of energy consumption, and (4) the energy intensity. He
concludes that the most signicant determinant of emission in transition economies is
energy intensity.
Secondly, the factors into which emissions are decomposed can dier across studies.
For instance, Sun (1999) conducts a 4-factor decomposition analysis on the emission of
carbon dioxide in the 24 OECD countries from 1960-1995. Specically, he uses the Sun-
Shapley index developed in Sun (1998), which is a modied version of the Lasperyrs index,
which generates no residuals. He decomposes the change in the emissions into 4 eects
(1)an emission coecient of CO2 following Torvanger (1991); (2)a structural change, (3)a
scale eect, and (4)an intensity eect. Note that in his paper, the emission coecient
is time invariant which is derived from the theoretical value in chemistry. Similarly, the
emission coecients in the Viguier (1999) study are calculated based on the parameters of
the substance content of fuels, the fraction of substance removed by pollution abatement,
and fraction of substance retained in ash respectively. The choice of parameter value is
based on the literature from the late 80s on data from the RAINS model (Amann 1990),
and OECD/IEA statistics. This is a time variant measurement of emission coecients,
so in a sense, it is superior to Torvanger; however, as mentioned before, the emission
amount is calculated using the emission factor, i.e., the variation comes only from the
dierence in the value of emission factors. In this paper, both the emission amount and
the fuel amount used per pollutant are reported at facility level, and thus, it gives much
richer variation in the analysis.
Third, the studies dier in how they use disaggregated data, whether they analyze
annual changes or changes over a certain period, or whether they aggregate an analysis
over several time periods. In this regard, Lofgren and Muller (2010) argue that the
results from a decomposition analysis are sensitive to this choice, and decomposition
analysis should be undertaken at the most disaggregated level possible to avoid biased
results.
Fourth, regarding the geographical coverage, most studies investigate the former EU-
15 countries and Asian countries, mainly China, with some studies focusing on the USA
and Canada or selected OECD and IEA countries (see e.g. Lofgren and Muller 2010).
Only few applications of a decomposition analysis in African countries or Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries exist, and in this respect, our study tries to ll this gap
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in the literature. One of the few studies which analyses the emission in CEE countries, is
Viguier (1999). He analyzes the SO2, NOx, and CO2 emissions in three Eastern countries
(Hungary, Poland, and Russia) and three OECD countries, (the U.S., the U.K., and
France) from 1971-1994. He uses the so-called energy-balance method to evaluate the
emissions by sector and nds that transition economies generally have a higher intensity of
emission. Then he proceeds to decompose energy intensities into 4 categories: (1) emission
factors4 (2) fuel mix (3) structural change and (4) energy intensity. He concludes that
the most signicant determinant of emissions in transition economies is energy intensity,
which is estimated using a bottom-up method. In our paper, it is obtained directly from
the data. Later in this paper, we discuss the dierence between our data set and that
from Viguier.
Another work that deals with former CIS countries is Cherp, Kopteva, and Mnat-
sakanian (2003). They analyze the quality of air in Russia from 1990-1999, using a
decomposition analysis. Specically, they decompose the change in emission intensity
into (1) change in the structure of the economy (a change in the share of sector) and (2)a
change in the amount of the emission by each sector (change in the intensity by sector).
He nds that the total air emission had decreased over the period mostly due to the de-
cline in economic output. Basically, he claims that in terms of emission in Russia, there
are two eects which go in the opposite direction. One is a structural eect which works
positively on emission because the Russian economy invested in an industrialized sector
and became pollution intensive. The other is the intensity eect which aects emissions
negatively because the technology became more environmentally friendly. In fact, our
paper shows that in the time period until 1999, the intensity eect was strongly negative
as in study of Cerp et al. and after 2000, the structural eect has the most dominant
and positive eect on the emission level in the Czech Republic.
Further Bruha and Scasny (2006) conduct a 3-factor decomposition analysis on the
emissions in the Czech Republic for the period between 1992-2003. Our paper extend the
time span of the data set to 2007 and conducts a deeper analysis using a more detailed
data set. We are able to further decompose the level of emission into 5 factors using the
facility level value directly obtained from the actual data.
4Emission factor is the same as the emission coecient in this paper. Both terms refer to the same
denition: the emission amount per particular type of fuel used.
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3.2 Methodology
To measure the magnitude of the contribution of each factor to the emissions of certain
pollutants over time, we conduct a decomposition analysis by aggregating pooled cross-
sectional data at the rm level with sectoral level panel data.
3.2.1 Decomposition analysis
There are several ways to conduct decomposition analysis. According to Ang (2004),
the method should be chosen such that it passes both the factor reversibility and time
reversibility tests. Of these tests, the most important test is the factor reversibility. To
pass the test of factor reversibility, it requires perfect decomposition, i.e., no residuals. In
this regard, the conventional Laspeyres index is not recommended because it can create
huge residuals, sometimes larger than the factors which should be analyzed.
The method used in Bruha and Scasny (2006) satises the critical points above, how-
ever, since their method is based on logarithmic approximation, their result is sensitive
towards large magnitude of change (more than a 10 % changes creates large approxima-
tion errors).
Given these reasons, we use the logarithmic mean Divisia index (LMDI) method in-
stead of the Laspeyres method, which satises the property of perfect decomposition and





= Dx1 ·Dx2 ·Dx3 · · ·Dxn ·Dresid,
where E is total magnitude of change in the emission, upper subscript denotes time,
Dy is the contribution of factor y to the emission level, Dresid is that of the residual
term, and xk, k = 1, ..., n is the factor into which the emission level of pollutants can be
decomposed.5 The eect of kth factor in multiplicative decomposition can be expressed
by:
Dxk = exp(






where i denotes sectors, and L(a, b) is the logarithmic average of the two numbers, a
and b.6
5E.g., in a 3-factor analysis, k=1, ..., 3, and in a 5-factor, k=1, ..., 5.
6Specically L(a, b) = a−blog a−log b , if a 6= b,else L(a, b) = a.
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On the other hand, in the additive decomposition, the emission level can be decom-
posed in the following way:
Êtot = E
T − E0
= D̂x1 + D̂x2 + D̂x3 + · · ·+ D̂xn + D̂resid,
where D̂xk denotes the contribution of kth factor to the change in emission from time
















, for all k.
In other words, unlike in the Laspeyres method, there is a clear linkage between addi-
tive and multiplicative decomposition in the LMDI method.7 Further, as the magnitude
of the total change becomes larger, the interpretation of the results becomes less intuitive
with the multiplicative LMDI, and we mainly focus on the additive LMDI to ease the
interpretation.
3.2.2 Three-factor analysis











where i denotes sector, and t denotes time (year in this case). The operator ∆X
expresses the fraction of the change in the variable X from time t− 1 to t. ∆tE denotes
the change in the emission. Yi is the change in the gross value added (GVA) in sector i.
Y is the sum of GVA across the sectors, i.e., the total output of the whole economy.
Thus, the rst term captures the eect of the change in the emission intensity (in-
tensity eect), the second term captures the eect of the change in the composition of
7For more discussion regarding the linkage, see Ang (2004).
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economic activity (composition eect), and the third term captures, then, the eect of
economic growth (scale eect).
3.2.3 Five-factor analysis
In addition to the emission level, our data set contains information on how much pollu-
tants are emitted by each type of fuel: Eijt, where j denotes the fuel type. Using the
richer information described above, we conduct not only the conventional decomposition
analysis described above, but also a ve-factor analysis: (1)an emission coecient eect
(EC), (2)a fuel mix eect (FM), (3)a fuel intensity eect (FI), (4)a composition eect,
and (5)a scale eect. In other words, we decompose the intensity eect further into three


























) - the fuel needed to produce a unit of output (GVA) [GJ/$GVA)]
We conduct the ve-factor analysis for ve categories of fuel: (1) Coal, (2) Bio wood
and other solids, (3) Natural Gas, (4) Other gas, and (5) Liquid fuels. A more detailed
categorization of the fuels is reported in Table3.1.
3.2.4 Zero Value Problems
Because of the logarithmic function in the equation, our analysis is sensitive to zero or
negative values in the data set. In order to deal with this problem, following Ang (2004),
we replace the negative or zero value with suciently small numbers,10−10− 10−20. Note
that this replacement is valid only when the following conditions are not satised (Wood
and Lenzen 2006):
(i) zero values outnumber non-zero values,
(ii) the data set contains many small values, and
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(iii) the magnitude of changes is large.
Looking at the summary statics of our data set, fortunately we do not have the
problem described; thus, we replace the negative or zero value with 10−10− 10−20 as Ang
suggests.8
3.3 Data
Our data set contains unique information on how much emission is produced by which
type of fuel, e.g., how much SO2 is emitted by the use of natural gas. This enables us
to conduct a ve-factor decomposition analysis as well as a three-factor analysis. The
analysis is conducted over REZZO 1 rms, which are the main sources of emissions: large
stationary sources of polluters whose thermal output is greater than 5 MW. First, we
summarize our data sources, the way we compile the original data set into the data set
which is used in the analysis in this paper, and then statistics of the compiled data.
3.3.1 Description of Data Set
The source of emission and energy data is the Air Pollution Emission Source Register
(REZZO  Register emisí zdroj· zne£i²t¥ní ovzdu²í). Database is compiled by the Czech
Hydro-Meteorological Institute and covers classical pollutants such as SO2, NOx, CxHy
(VOC), CO, and particulates matter (and other trace pollutants) as well as the con-
sumption of more than 20 types of fuel per all emission sources. The REZZO database
distinguishes four broad categories of emission sources in which data are stored: category
Rezzo1 (R1) and R2 includes large and medium-sized emission sources, grouped by their
thermal output amounts that are larger or smaller than 5MW respectively; R3 reports
the emission released by local units, including households and area sources, while R4
reports emissions from mobile sources. In the case of large emission sources (R1), data
are gathered at facility level. Data for medium-sized sources (R2) are reported at the
rm level.
Having information about the rm and its associated sector allows us to collapse the
environmental data at the sector level. To ensure the consistency with the economic
variables, we collapse the environmental data into 60 sectors. The share of emissions
released from the combustion processes of large stationary emission sources (R1comb) on
8If we encountered the problems described above, we would use the alternative methodology proposed
by Wood and Lanzen (2006).
80
total aggregate emission is described in Figure 3.1. As can be seen, the emission of SOx
and NOx from R1comb represent a large amount of total emissions, about 80% over the
entire period. Regarding particulate matters, the share of R1comb decreased from 40%
in 1995 to 16% in 2007 due to a strict abatement introduced in large sources.9 Large
combustion sources contribute to emission of CO and VOC by only a small amount, 5%
to 8% or 6% to 14% respectively.
In REZZO, we can further divide the emissions attributable to stationary sources
(R1 and R2 categories) into two broad categories. The rst category covers the emis-
sion generated from the combustion of fuels, the second covers the emission generated
from various kinds of technological processes. While our database on combustion pro-
cesses allows us to derive emissions per fuel type used for each unit, the emissions from
technological processes does not contain the information on the attribution of a specic
fuel. That is why, in this paper, we particularly focus on the emission by R1 combustion
process.
There are three possibilities for emission sources, which can generate emissions from
fuel combustion. The homogenous unit describes a facility, which burns only one specic
type of fuel, and as a matter of fact, all emissions can be directly attributed to this
specic type of fuel. In some cases, however, the facility can use two types of energy,
when the second type of fuel is used only in negligible amounts compared to the rst one.
For instance, natural gas can be used to re up a coal-burning furnace. In such cases,
we attribute all emissions to the rst, the main type of fuel. In the case of burning more
types of fuel (known as non-homogenous units), we attribute the respective emission for
each type of fuel based on the technical information of each boiler used.
It should also be noted that the denition of CxHy changed before and after 2001: after
2001, methane is included though before 2001, it was not. Thus, we conduct our analysis
separately for 2 periods. From the data set described above, we compute summary
statistics for the emission level of the pollutants and the Gross Value Added (GVA) (see
Figure 3.1). All values are nomalized to the value of the year 1995 (100). The GVA
value is adjusted with respect to current price level, using the GDP deator. By looking
at the constant decline until 1999 (the complete obligation due date was December 31st,
1998), we can see that the law 117/1997 which limits the emission amount of all the basic
9Admittedly, our composition eect does not include the change in contribution of R1 to the emission
of PM, and we should note that during the period 1995-1999 when the share of the R1comb on total
emission of PM changes, the degree of the compositional eect can be negatively biased.
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pollutants except for VOC seems to have been quite eective,
REZZO reports fuel consumption for 24 energy types overall, which we merge into
ve broader categories in our analysis as described in Table 3.1. In Figure 3.2, the trend
of fuel from 1995 to 2007 is displayed. Overall, the total consumption of fuels by R1comb
rms remained more or less at the same level over 1997-2007 except in the earlier years
when fuels were used more. Coal share over total energy used is 80%. Natural gas and
other gases contributed by about 15%, use of oils were declining from 5% to 2% of the
total energy used. Contrary to oils, the consumption of biomass was increasing from 0.5%
to about 1% in 2007. The consumption of the fuels is presented in Figure 3.2.
Consumption of other gas was partly substituted by the consumption of natural gas,
i.e., the consumption of natural gas was increasing over the period, whereas that of the
other gases decreased. Most of the emission factors for each type of fuel were decreasing,
which indicates more ecient abatement. In Table 3.2, we also compare the emission
coecient for each major fuel type with the average emission factor as used in Viguier
(1999) for three countries (Russia, Poland, and Hungary) in the year 1994. As can be
seen, most of the Viguier values, except for the emission from natural gas, are much larger
than the value derived from the REZZO database for the Czech Republic.
3.4 Results
In this section, we document the ndings from our decomposition analysis. First, we
present those of a 3-factor analysis and secondly, 5-factor analysis follows.
3.4.1 Three-factor analysis
The results of the three-factor analysis are presented in Figure3. 3-3.8 in the appendix.
As mentioned above, since VOC changed its denition in our data set, we analyzed VOC
for 2 separate periods, 1995-2001 and 2002-2007 (Figure 3.9& Figure 3.10). First of all,
we can see that the law which requires large sources to decrease their emission levels of
basic air pollutants until the end of 1998 and came into force in middle of 1997, was
quite eective. All the pollutants except VOC, SOx, NOx, CO, and PM decrease from
1997 to 1999 signicantly, and this downward trend suddenly diminishes in 2000. From
this result, we can see that after satisfying the emission limit, the rms did not have the
incentive to decrease emissions further, so the emission level since 2000 stays more or less
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constant. This is one of the concerns regarding command and control regulation: It will
not motivate rms to decrease emissions further than the requirement. One reason is
that as a country develops, the structure of its economy becomes less emission intensive,
and thus, we should see a decreasing in the emission level with the higher development of
the economy. However, our result shows that this is not the case in the Czech Republic
in this period.
The results of all air pollutants show that the most important factor during the
period 1995-1999, when the emission levels of the pollutants signicantly decreased, is
the intensity eect, which captures the contribution of the change in emission intensity
over output of the economy. To see this intensity eect more closely, we continue to a
5-factor analysis, decomposing the intensity eect into 3 factors.
3.4.2 Five-factor analysis
In the three-factor decomposition of airborne emissions, we nd that the intensity eect
was negative with respect to the emissions of SO2, NOx, PM and CO, except for some
years (e.g. 2000, 2001) over the entire period analyzed. In the ve-factor analysis  whose
results are presented in Figures 3.9-3.14  the intensity eect is further decomposed into
a fuel intensity eect, a fuel mix eect, and a emission coecient eect in order to nd
the main driver of emission changes.
The rst interesting nding is that the emission coecient eect is negative for all
the pollutants except for VOC until 1999, i.e., when the Air Quality Act required the
fullllment of the emission targets. It suggests that the rms focused their eort on
satisfying the requirement by introducing or adjusting end-of-pipe technologies. In terms
of NOx emission (Figure 3.13), the emission coecient factor had a smaller eect than
the other pollutants, such as SOx, and PM, due to the fact that it is more dicult to
abate nitrogen emissions than other air pollutants. The emission of CxHy released by
large stationary emission sources was not primarily targeted by the Air Quality Law
(Decree 117/1997), and as a result, the emission coecient did not play a signicant role
in changing their volume in the later period (2003-2007).
Second, the fuel intensity eect  measured by total GJ used in production per
monetary unit of GVA was negative after 2001 when the eect was mostly due to a
relatively larger increase in economic output compared to energy use. The fuel intensity
eect led to an increase in emissions particularly in two years, 1997 and 2000. This
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eect was mainly due to a decrease in the economic output of the power sector, which is
particularly pollution-intensive (NACE 40) and some manufacturing sectors (NACE 26,
27) in those years. At the country level, the year 1997 is characterized by the largest
decrease in economic output due to recession, while energy consumption in its aggregate
increased in 2000 by the largest amount (9%). During 1995-2000, the fuel intensity eect
was stable or was slightly increasing, which suggests that investment was aimed more
at improving environmental technology in production processes than in saving energy,
keeping the economic output at the same level. The interesting point is that the real
price of energy largely increased in 1997, 2000, and 2005-06; however, relatively slow
adjustments of the rms resulted in a larger negative fuel intensity eect in the years
that followed (1999, 2002-03, or 2006 respectively).
The fuel mix eect was mostly negative in the case of particulate matters until 2000,
which suggests changing the input towards environmentally friendly fuels.
3.4.3 A cumulative analysis of ve factor decomposition
Table 3.3 reports a cumulative change in the emission levels and the decomposition of
this change into ve eects. During the entire period 1995-2007, the emission of PM,
SOx and CO was reduced by 93%, 82%, and 69%; the emission of NOx was reduced
lessk; however, still by 29% compared to the initial levels in 1995. In the case of PM,
SOx, CO emissions, the emission coecient eect led to their reductions most, while the
composition eect is the strongest for NOx emission.
In Viguer (1999), the author decomposes the emissions of CO2, SOx, and NOx in CEE
countries during their transition period: an analysis is conducted in Hungary, Poland
and the USSR during 1990-1994. The energy intensity (measured as an aggregate fuel
consumption per unit of production at the country level) and fuel quality, (emissions per
fuel type used on a given economic sector, i.e. emission coecient) have the strongest
eect on changes in emission intensities in the three analyzed Eastern European countries
in Viguier (1999). Specically, the energy intensity eect has a strong eect in Hungary
and Poland, and the emission coecient has a strong eect in the Czech Republic and the
USSR. In other words, in the Czech Republic and the USSR, there was an improvement
in abatement technology, and it contributed signicantly to the reduction of the emissions
of air pollutants during the period analyzed in both studies.
On the other hand, the energy intensity had a reverse direction on emissions than
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the emission coecient had in three countries; it decreased the intensities in Hungary
and Poland, but increased them in the USSR and the Czech Republic for some period.
there was This shows investment activity in energy-saving technologies in Hungary and
Poland during 1990-1994, which was not actually the case in the USSR nor in the Czech
Republic. In this respect, the situation during 1995-1999 in the Czech Republic was more
comparable with the situation in the USSR from 1990 to 1994. Admittedly, since our
data generation process, methodology, and time period covered10 are quite dierent from
those of Viguier (1999), one might not be able to simply compare the results. However,
we believe that the comparison of our study and similar studies conducted in transition
countries would still give some policy implications.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a driving force of an increase or decrease in the emission levels
of various pollutants in the Czech Republic by using decomposition analysis. Using the
unique data set we obtain, which contains information on the amount of emission per
particular type of fuels, we manage to conduct a ner decomposition analysis than found
in existing studies. We nd that the law which required the large sources to satisfy
emission limit till the end of 1998 was quite eective in reducing emissions: it motivated
rms to improve upon their environmental eciency, especially abatement technology,
represented by and end-of-pipe technology and decreased emission amounts during the
period 1995-1999 by using fuel eciently in terms of emission.
After 2000, the emission levels of the pollutants stay more or less stable, which is
quite intuitive if one considers the criticism over command-control environmental policies
being "motivatively discouraging". Further, in some periods, change in structure of the
economy in the Czech Republic actually contributed to an increase in emission levels,
which is inconsistent with the other reasoning related to EKC hypothesis: as a country
develops, the structure of the economy becomes less emission intensive, and thus, we see
a downward trend in emission levels.
Decomposition analysis with a longer time span might give us more interesting results,
considering the eect of the EU-ETS system implemented in 2005. Firms are expected to
decrease the fuels consumed to reduce GHG emissions, and thus, instead of an emission
10Our decomposition analysis starts in 1995 when the Viguer analysis just ends (it covers the period
of 1970 to 1994).
85
coecient eect, fuel mix or fuel intensity might be prominent in the future. Further, we
have to admit that the decomposition analysis usually does not prove causality, and in
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Figure 3.1: Emission of the air pollutants (R1combustion process),































Figure 3.3: Composition of emission in terms of Rezzo



















Figure 3.4: Fuel consumption share of Rezzo























Figure 3.5: 3 factor decomposition (SO2), 1995 - 2007




















Figure 3.6: 3 factor decomposition (PM), 1995 - 2007



















Figure 3.7: 3 factor decomposition (NOx), 1995 - 2007






















Figure 3.8: 3 factor decomposition (CO), 1995-2007






















Figure 3.9: 3 factor decomposition (VOC),1995-2001






















Figure 3.10: 3 factor decomposition (VOC), 2002-2007

























Figure 3.11: 5 factor decomposition (SO2), 1995 - 2007
























Figure 3.12: 5 factor decomposition (PM), 1995 - 2007





















Figure 3.13: 5 factor decomposition (NOx), 1995 - 2007
























Figure 3.14: 5 factor decomposition (CO), 1995- 2007
























Table 3.1: Fuel Category
Broader categories of fuel Rened category
Coal Hard coal - energetic, low quality, sorted
Lignite - energetic, low quality, sorted
Bio wood and other solid Bio wood, Briquettes, Coke, Other solid fuel
Natural gas Natural gas
Other gas Blast furnace Gas, Coal gas, Coke gas, Generator gas,
LPG, Other gas fuel
Liquid fuels Gas oil, Gas oil - extra low sulphur, low sulphur, Naphta
Heavy oil, Middle oil, Liquid fuel
Table 3.2: Comparison of Emission Coecients
SOx 1995 2000 2005 Poland Hungary U.S.A
Coal (kg/toe) 55.71 11.78 10.50 27.7 81.2 41.4
Bio Wood and Other Solid 4.59 4.95 11.59 - - -
Natural Gas (kg/toe) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Gas 9.11 0.86 0.60 - - -
Oil (kg/toe) 35.08 16.84 12.32 13.4 15.2 3.5
NOx 1995 2000 2005 Poland Hungary U.S.A
Coal (kg/toe) 8.79 6.83 6.68 14.4 14.8 41.5
Bio Wood and Other Solid 6.54 8.74 4.26 - - -
Natural Gas (kg/toe) 5.05 2.63 2.18 3.3 2.7 3.1
Other Gas 4.44 1.48 4.04 - - -
Oil (kg/toe) 7.76 4.71 4.97 16.1 11.9 9.2
The values for Poland, Hungary and U.S.A are in the year of 1994, and taken from Viquier (1999).
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Table 3.3: Cumulative contribution of factors (1995-2007)
PM SO2 NOX CO
1995-2007
Total change -93.1% -82.1% -28.7% -69.2%
Scale eect 2.4% 1.0% -3.4% 5.8%
Composition eect -9.2% -17.5% -21.8% -18.0%
Fuel Intensity -9.7% 9.3% 12.5% 4.5%
Fuel Mix -9.0% -3.6% -2.7% -21.4%
Emission Coecient -67.6% -71.3% -13.2% -40.1%
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